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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is the Appeal of Plaintiff Marc Smith, "Smith", of 
the orders of the Sixth Judicial District Court on three 
motions for summary judgment of Defendants Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Company, UGCE"; Martin Mathis, "Mathis"; Michael 
Denoyer, "Denoyer"; and Donald Saunders, uSaunders", sometimes 
collectively referred to as ucombined Appellees". The 
Defendant Ronald R. Smith has been dismissed from this suit 
and is not a part of this Appeal. 
Since the filing of this suit, Appellee Donald Saunders 
has died. His estate has been notified and become substituted 
as a party, pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 25(a) and by order of 
the court below dated March 13, 2001, See Addendum 2028-2029. 
Otherwise, the caption of this case on appeal contains the 
names of all parties. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Supreme 
Court granted the parties' Joint Petition for Permission to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order, by order dated September 26, 2 001, 
see Supplemental Addendum 2 058-2 057, and shall as well hear 
issues determined by the Sixth Judicial District Court to be 
final under Utah R.Civ. P. 54(b), by order dated August 23, 
2001. See Addendum, 2041-2040. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This appeal raises the following issues: 
1. Whether the court below erred in granting the 
combined Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on Smith's 
breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing claims arising from the termination of Smith's 
employment with GCE? Smith alleged GCE and the individual 
Appellees breached GCE's employment agreement with him and the 
inherent covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
terminating him without cause. The court concluded that, 
while material issues of fact existed as to implied terms and 
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fm.wpd 1 
conditions of employment and whether Smith had overcome the 
presumption of at will employment, the termination documents 
executed by the parties at Smith's separation constituted an 
accord, effectively waiving and releasing all Appellees from 
any claim Smith may have had arising from his employment 
agreement with Grand Canyon Expedition Company. 
2 . Whether the court below erred in granting the 
combined Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on Smith's 
claim that the combined Appellees breached a stock buy-sell 
agreement between the parties, along with the inherent 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by reason of their 
failure to adjust historic accounting practices when they 
calculated the net book value at the time of their forced buy 
out of Smith? Smith claims that GCE's historic accounting of 
the value of its assets, acquisitions and income were kept 
artificially low for tax purposes and should have been 
adjusted at the time of the combined Appellees' forced buy out 
of Smith to accurately reflect the real net book value of GCE 
as of the date of the buy out. The court reasoned, in 
essence, that there were not facts sufficient to support a 
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conclusion that the accounting practices employed at Smith's 
departure were influenced by his forced exit and therefore the 
accord reached between the parties upon Smith's departure bars 
any claim arising from the historic accounting practices. 
3. Whether the court below erred in granting the 
combined Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
question of whether or not Smith is entitled to punitive 
damages? 
4. Whether the court below erred in granting the 
combined Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on Smith's 
claim for attorneys' fees as consequential damages? 
5. Whether the court below erred in denying Smith's 
motion for leave to amend its complaint to add a claim for 
unjust enrichment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's rulings of Smith's motions for summary 
judgment will be reviewed under the same standard as that 
applied by the trial court. In other words, the appellate 
court will view the facts and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 
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opposing the motion. The trial court's conclusions of law are 
reviewed for correctness. E.g. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. 
Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Issues of contractual interpretation are also reviewed for 
correctness, affording the district court no deference. 
Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 
1998) [citations omitted]. The reviewing court may affirm on 
any ground available to the trial court regardless of whether 
it was relied upon in reaching the decision from which an 
appeal is sought. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
241 (Utah 1993). The trial court's denial of Smith's motion 
for leave to amend will be reviewed on an abuse of discretion 
standard. E.g. Harper v. Summit County, 963 P. 2d 768, 779 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
1. Utah law articulating the elements and appropriate 
analysis in the area of accord and satisfaction is articulated 
in Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985); 
Estate Landscaping and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322, 
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(Utah 1992) and revisited in ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 
P.2d 254 (Utah 2000). 
2. Utah law of waiver as it relates to Appellant's 
execution of documents surround the termination of his 
employment and stock buyout is addressed in Soters, Inc. v. 
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 
1993) . 
3. Utah law generally as it relates to breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as articulated 
in St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P. 2d 194 (Utah 1991) and its progeny. There do not appear to 
be any Utah Cases specifically addressing breach of such a 
covenant inherent in a stock buy-sell agreement. 
4. Utah law regarding recovery of punitive damages for 
claims predicated on breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and the opportunity to plead and prove 
punitive damages is included in CooJc Associates, Inc. v. 
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); St. Benedict's Development 
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 199 (Utah 1991); Utah 
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R.Civ. P. 54(c) (1); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 
P.2d 1175 (Utah 1983). 
5. Utah law as it relates to recovery of attorney's fees 
as consequential damages, including recovery of such fees for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an 
employment agreement and stock buy-sell agreement is addressed 
in Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989); 
Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992); and, Heslop 
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). 
5. The law of Utah as it relates to unjust enrichment, 
including whether unjust enrichment is an appropriate remedy 
is found in E.g. American Towers Owners' Ass'n v. CCI Mech., 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Marc Smith, had made his life's career running 
river rafting trips through the Grand Canyon. He worked full 
time for Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. a corporation owned by 
his older brother, Ronald R. Smith, beginning in about 1968, 
for 18 years as a river guide, chief river guide and manager. 
In 198 6, when Ronald R. Smith sold Grand Canyon Expeditions, 
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Inc. to a group of individuals led by Appellee Donald 
Saunders, Smith became an owner, director and officer, along 
with Denoyer, Mathis, Saunders and, his brother Ron, of the 
newly incorporated company known as Grand Canyon Expeditions 
Company, UGCE". 
Smith's two working partners, Denoyer, and Mathis, had 
previously worked together at a competitor of Grand Canyon 
Expeditions, Inc., White Water River Expeditions. Denoyer was 
a manager for White Water River Expeditions and Mathis was a 
seasonal employee, working as a boatman for White Water 
running a couple river trips a year. Denoyer and Mathis were 
both involved from the beginning with Saunders, who financed 
the purchase of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. from Ron Smith, 
and the organization of GCE. Saunders wanted to retain both 
the owner of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. and Smith, who had 
been running the warehouse, equipment and crew for Grand 
Canyon Expeditions, Inc., to assure that the new Corporation, 
GCE, would continue to operate as it had been until then. 
However, although Denoyer and Mathis were happy with their 
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positions in the new company, they were not happy that they 
were being forced to work with a "third" partner. 
As part of the acquisition, Smith, Denoyer and Mathis 
were each required to sign an employment agreement, promissory 
notes and a stock agreement dated as of November 29, 1986. 
These agreements, along with conversations at the time of the 
organization of the purchasing entity, and continuing 
thereafter in meetings and exchanges among the investors, 
along with the parties' course of dealing with each other, 
comprehend the business relationship between the parties. The 
employment agreement provided for an initial term of one year. 
The initial promissory note called for repayment in January of 
1992. The buy-sell agreement provided the mechanism for the 
acquisition of an outgoing party's stock in the corporation 
with an accelerated schedule to be used in the calculation of 
the outgoing shareholders purchase price. Pursuant to the 
buy-sell agreement, Smith became obligated upon termination of 
his employment at GCE, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to 
sell to GCE, and GCE was obligated to buy from Smith, all of 
his shares of stock in GCE. The price for the shares was to 
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be based upon a percentage of net book value of such shares as 
determined in the sole and conclusive discretion of GCE's 
accountant. Under the agreement, the buyout price escalated 
over time from 100 percent to 140 percent of net book value. 
Smith brought his experience, knowledge and expertise to 
GCE. He shared that experience, knowledge and expertise with 
his partners Denoyer and Mathis. In 1991, GCE acquired a 
competing river running company known as Whitewater/Sobek. 
With this acquisition the officers of GCE increased their 
shares of stock; however, the acquisition also greatly diluted 
the stock value. In conjunction with the Whitewater/Sobek 
acquisition and the increase of percentage ownership in the 
company, the parties executed a second promissory note payable 
December 1998. 
In July 1992, almost six years into the enterprise, after 
Denoyer and Mathis had had the opportunity to learn the 
intricacies of running and managing a river running operation, 
Denoyer, the president of the company, fired Smith, which 
termination contractually obligated Smith to sell his shares 
in GCE back to the Corporation. He was given no reason or 
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explanation for his termination. He was given no notice, 
either formal or otherwise; nor was any other shareholder, 
officer, or director of GCE provided with written notice of 
the impending unilateral decision, or any opportunity to 
inquire or investigate the matter, prior to ousting Smith, 
their partner and co-owner from his position with GCE. The 
value of the stock was substantially lower than it had been in 
the past when Smith was terminated from GCE. The reasons for 
and basis of Smith's termination and subsequent liquidation of 
his stock position in GCE are the subject of his breach of 
contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing claims. The claims arise from his employment 
agreement with GCE as well as from his buy-sell agreement with 
combined Appellees. 
Upon his departure, Smith and GCE negotiated termination 
documents whereby Smith resigned his position as director and 
officer and acknowledged the calculation of his buy out. 
Smith subsequently discovered that, due to historic 
accounting practices, the calculation of the net book value of 
his stock as of July 1992, which was performed in the sole and 
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conclusive discretion of GCE, did not accurately and fairly 
reflect the real net book value of the corporation at that 
time and realized that he had been deprived of that 
substantial benefit of his bargain with Appellees. This suit 
based on his wrongful termination and loss of benefit of his 
bargain under the buy-sell agreement followed. 
Well after the suit was filed and the parties were 
engaged in substantial discovery and motions, Smith became 
aware that GCE received a refund of an Arizona state amusement 
tax in the amount of $907,916.94 for taxes assessed Grand 
Canyon from 1986 through 1992. On March 31, 1999, Smith 
motioned the court for leave to amend its complaint to add a 
claim for unjust enrichment based on the amusement tax refund 
of taxes collected and paid to the state of Arizona during the 
time he owned a percentage of GCE. In its March 20, 2000 
Memorandum Decision, the court below elected to avoid the 
quagmire of getting into an unjust enrichment analysis and 
determined instead to allow Smith to pursue his claim for a 
portion of the Arizona amusement tax refund under his theory 
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of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
court below denied Smith's motion for leave to amend. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES BELOW 
On about June 29, 1998, Smith filed a second amended 
complaint asserting two causes of action, the first for breach 
of contract and the second for breach of covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing against all of the Appellees. Smith's 
breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
claims are based on the performances and conduct of the 
parties under the subject employment agreement and the 
stockholders buy-sell agreement. See Addendum 181-213. 
On March 31, 1999, Smith moved to amend his second 
amended complaint to add a claim for unjust enrichment based 
on the receipt by GCE of the Arizona amusement tax refund. 
All Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on about 
October 30, 1998, a second motion for summary judgment on 
March 22, 1999 and a third motion for summary judgment on 
October 5, 2000. By memorandum decisions dated January 15, 
1999, Addendum 807-815; March 20, 2000, Addendum 1713-1721; 
and January 27, 2001, Addendum 2011-2022; and Order dated July 
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31, 2001, Addendum 2030-2033, the court granted Appellees' 
motion for summary judgment on Smith's breach of contract and 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims as it relates 
to Smith's employment, GCE's historic accounting practices and 
failure to make adjustment at time of Smith's buy out, but 
denied the combined Appellees' motion as to Smith's claim for 
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as it 
relates to the Arizona amusement tax refund question. As the 
court concluded that the issue related to Smith's entitlement 
to a portion of the Arizona tax refund question fell within 
the ambit of his covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
claim, it denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint 
to add the unjust enrichment claim. See Addendum 1713-1721. 
The parties jointly petitioned the Supreme Court for 
permission to appeal the trial court's July 31, 2 001 order on 
the Appellees' motions for summary judgment, Smith's motion 
for leave to amend the complaint, and other rulings which 
Appellees will raise on cross appeal. That petition was 
granted by order dated September 26, 2001, see Supplemental 
Addendum 2058-2057. The parties also jointly petitioned the 
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trial court pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 54(b) for certification 
of the trial court's prior order regarding Smith's breach 
claims as they arose from his allegations of wrongful 
termination and otherwise out of the employment relationship. 
See Addendum 2039-2034. That order was granted by the trial 
court on September 7, 2 0 01. See Addendum 2 041-2040. 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's dismissal of Smith's wrongful 
termination claim against Appellees was in error. The 
documents, discussions and course of dealings between the 
parties over the six years of the enterprise evidence a clear 
intention of an implied term of the employment contract that 
Smith could not be terminated without cause. The record shows 
that Smith was not an at-will employee, but a corporate 
officer, a stock owner, and active in the day to day 
operations of the business, and that all parties intended this 
to be a long term business commitment. Appellees needed to 
show cause in order to fire Smith, which they failed to do. 
The record shows a material dispute of fact surrounding the 
terms of Smith's employment that should have overcome 
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Appellees' motions for summary judgment. The court below 
recognized these issues of fact but then retreated to the 
documents executed in conjunction with Smith's termination and 
buy out to conclude that he had reached an accord, effectively 
waiving and releasing Appellees from all such claims. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Smith's claim based 
on Appellees' breach of contract and their covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing as it related to the calculation of 
GCE's net book value at the time of Appellees' buyout of 
Smith. Smith argued that the Appellees breached their 
contractual obligations and covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by relying on historic corporate accounting procedures 
used for tax purposes, the net effect of which was to 
establish a net book value artificially low at the time of his 
forced buy-out and substantially lower than the real net book 
value of the business. This calculus included inappropriate 
amortization of several large assets, as well as the booking 
of, the depreciation of, and the general accounting treatment 
of the purchased assets of the acquired company 
Whitewater/Sobek. As issues of material fact exist as to the 
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nature of the historic accounting methods and the proper 
calculation of "net book value", summary judgment was 
inappropriate. The court below avoided any analysis of the 
facts but simply relied, in its ruling on Appellees' third 
summary judgment motion, on its accord analysis in its ruling 
on Appellees' first motion and dismissed Smith's claim. 
The trial court's dismissal of Smith's claim for punitive 
damages and attorneys' fees was premature and in error. 
Punitive damages are an appropriate remedy if Smith can 
establish at trial evidence of intentional conduct, 
willfulness, malice or reckless disregard of rights on the 
part of the Appellees, by reason of conduct arising to the 
level of an independent tort. In this case, Appellees' 
intentionally, willfully or recklessly sought out to learn the 
operation of the business and then to terminate Smith; and 
then willfully, intentionally and recklessly deprived Smith of 
the real value of his interest in GCE when he was forced to 
sell his stock for a price which was based on an artificially 
low valuation of GCE. Smith was never given the chance to 
establish the elements of these torts before the trier of 
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fact, and dismissal by summary judgment was premature and in 
error. 
Further, attorney's fees are recoverable for a breach of 
good faith and fair dealing under a reasonable extension of 
existing Utah case law, and the trial court's dismissal of 
Smith's claim was premature and in error. 
Finally, the court abused its discretion in denying 
Smith's motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a claim 
for unjust enrichment. The court below simply dispensed with 
the motion without evaluating the allegations of plaintiff's 
complaint and the legal theories by concluding that any 
recovery of the Arizona amusement tax refund fits within 
Smith's theory of breach of the covenant of good and fair 
dealing under the stock buy-sell agreement. In so doing, the 
court deprived Smith of the alternative equitable theory of 
unjust enrichment should the court at trial conclude that 
Smith's claim falls without the ambit of his contract with 
Appellees. 
ARGUMENT 
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I. SMITH'S TERMINATION FROM GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS' EMPLOY 
AND AS AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR AND CO-OWNER OF THE COMPANY 
WAS WRONGFUL AND CONSTITUTED A BREACH OF CONTRACT AND OF 
APPELLEES' OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
A. No accord was reached between Smith and Appellees at 
the termination of Smith's participation in GCE 
Enterprise nor were any potential claims waived or 
released. 
The court below erred in granting summary judgment on 
Smith's employment-related claims. It dispensed with all 
issues and potential issues related to Smith's employment with 
GCE and his participation in the GCE enterprise with the 
individual Appellees by concluding that an accord was reached 
between the parties, "between July 15 and July 25, 1992 as 
reflected in the termination documents." See the Trial 
Court's January 15, 1999 Memorandum Decision at p. 6, included 
as Addendum 807-815. To this end, the court reasoned 
Plaintiff's resignation is short and simple 
and is signed and notarized. The 
accompanying agreement provides for the 
purchase of Plaintiff's stock at 140 
percent of value, consistent with the Buy-
Sell Agreement, and affords him two other 
forms of relief to which he does not appear 
to have been previously entitled. These 
two benefits are respectively a severance 
payment equivalent to one year's salary and 
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the second, a relaxation of a non-
competition covenant. 
Under paragraph 6 of the termination 
agreement, the severance pay was "In 
addition to the payments provided above 
[for stock purchases] , and in lieu of any 
other amounts or benefits which may be due 
from the corporation as provided in the 
Employment Agreement or otherwise . . ." 
This is strong language. 
Id. The court continues to point out the facts it considered 
important as a basis of its "accord" holding. Those were that 
it was Smith who suggested the possibility of a severance 
payment and Saunders agreed; that Smith stopped short of 
claiming fraud in the inducement of his signature on the 
severance payments; that Smith was aware of the existence of 
a non-compete obligation; that GCE agreed to waive the right 
to enforce its non-competition agreement; and, that Smith 
accepted payments contemporaneously as well as those made 
after execution of the agreements. See Addendum 807-815. 
Under Utah law, " [a]n accord and satisfaction arises when 
the parties to a contract agree that a different performance, 
to be made in substitution of the performance originally 
agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under the 
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original agreement." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P. 2d 
254, 259 (Utah 2000) (citations omitted). To prevail on the 
claim of the existence of an accord, the moving party must 
show u(l) an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over 
the amount due; (2) the payment offered as full settlement of 
the entire dispute; and, (3) an acceptance of the payment as 
full settlement of the dispute." Id. citing Marton Remodeling 
v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985). 
As a preliminary matter, accord of satisfaction is an 
affirmative defense under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (c) 
which must be raised in an answer or it is waived. See 
generally Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilkin, 668 P. 2d 493 
(Utah 1983) . As accord and satisfaction has not been included 
as an affirmative defense in this action, nor ever squarely 
raised in a motion or argument in support of summary judgment, 
the court further erred in injecting its accord analysis in 
dismissing Smith's employment and buy-sell agreement claims. 
The facts before the court below do not support a finding 
that an unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute over an amount 
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existed at the time the so-called ''termination documents" were 
executed. Between July 15 and July 25, 1992, after Smith was 
terminated and before he executed the "termination documents", 
he surely was aware that there may be concerns related to the 
termination of his employment. However, at that time he had 
no reason to believe, nor was any evidence produced that Smith 
had the documents or knowledge sufficient to evaluate GCE's 
unilateral and conclusive determination of the net book value 
of GCE in calculating what it was to pay under its forced buy-
out of Smith's shares. Further, no evidence was produced, nor 
does any exist that a dispute as to the buy-out amount existed 
at that point. The court was silent in the application of any 
particular facts to the law of accord in evaluating the three 
required elements of Marton. Id. As no real unliquidated 
claim for a bona fide dispute as to GCE's calculation of the 
buy out amount was known at the time of the execution of the 
"termination documents" to exist, Appellees failed in showing 
the first element of their claim of accord. 
Second, even if Smith fully appreciated his employment 
and buy-sell agreement claims at the time of his precipitous 
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termination from employment and resulting forced buy out of 
his position in the GCE enterprise, the evidence presented in 
support of Appellees' motions for summary judgment does not 
support its finding that the payments made to Smith by GCE 
were final or offered, accepted, and agreed upon by the 
parties as full resolution and satisfaction of the disputed 
claim. See ProMax at 260. 
The "termination documents" referred to by the court 
below consist of a document styled "Agreement" dated July 25, 
1992 and a second document styled "Resignation" dated July 25, 
1992. See Addendum 1498-1495 and 217. The January 25, 1992 
Agreement sets forth all of the obligations of Smith as 
follows: 
Smith hereby sells, assigns and transfers 
all of his right, title and interest in and 
to the Shares owned by him for a total 
purchase price of One Hundred Eighty Six 
Thousand Thirty Nine and 37/100 Dollars. 
($186,039.37). The purchase price has been 
determined in accordance with the terms of 
the Buy-Sell Agreement based upon One 
Hundred Forty Percent (14 0%) of the 
Corporation's net book value as of June 30, 
1992. 
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Upon receipt of the above check, Smith 
shall endorse it to Donald A. Saunders 
which shall constitute payment in full of 
all amounts owed by Smith to Donald A. 
Saunders . . . Said note shall be 
canceled. 
Smith shall resign as an officer and 
employee of the Corporation effective July 
15, 1992 and shall execute a resignation 
letter. . . 
Deliver Certificate No. 4 for 4,250 shares 
. and Certificate No. 9 for 2,348 
shares of Corporation stock . . . endorsed 
on the back by Marc Smith. 
Marc Smith shall not disclose confidential 
information regarding the business of the 
Corporation acquired during his employment 
including but not limited to . . . 
Smith represents and warrants that there 
are no liens or other encumbrances against 
any of the Corporation stock certificates 
owned by him except for the lien in favor 
of Donald A. Saunders . . . . 
See Addendum 14 98-14 95. There is no other language in the 
Contract obligating Smith to do anything. Nor is there any 
language of an expression of GCE's intention that the payments 
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made under that agreement are intended to constitute payment 
in full of a disputed claim or unliquidated amount. In cases 
where the courts have recognized a valid accord, they rely on 
language like that found on a check which states that the 
payment constitutes "full settlement, payment in full", see 
Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 WL 726259 *5 (Utah App. 2001), 
Supplemental Addendum 2069-2059; or, a letter written and 
forwarded with payment which states 
Based on the above identified billing 
descrepancies [sic] we have enclosed a 
check for $8,613, which is payment in full 
for satisfaction of contracted services. 
If you are not willing to accept that sum, 
$8,613 in full satisfaction of the sums due 
DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your 
negotiation of that check, we will treat 
the matter as fully paid. 
See Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322, 
324-325 (Utah 1992). While the court may look beyond the 
express contract terms in determining the intention of the 
party making payment, the evidence presented to the trial 
court in this case was merely the contract language along with 
the parties' respective interpretations of the negotiation of 
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the severance payment and waiver of the covenant not to 
compete. See Addendum 807-815. The evidence presented to the 
trial court in the course of the motions for summary judgment 
is an inadequate manifestation on the part of GCE and the 
individual Appellees that the payments made as outlined in the 
July 25, 1992 Agreement were intended as a full compromise of 
disputed claims or unliquidated amounts. The evidence does 
not support the conclusion that Smith accepted payments as a 
discharge of his original agreement with Appellees. 
Nor is the language of the July 25, 1992 Agreement and 
Resignation adequate to provide as a matter of law a waiver or 
release of any claims that Smith may have had at the time. 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. Soters, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 
857 P.2d 935, 939-940 (Utah 1993); citing Reese v. 
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 
1991). Proving waiver requires three elements: Ml) an 
existing right, benefit or advantage; (2) knowledge of its 
existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish that right." 
Id. Any waiver "must be distinctly made, although it may be 
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express or implied." Id. citing Phoenix, Inc. v. Heath, 61 
P.2d 308, 311 (Utah 1936). The court's reiteration of the 
Phoenix statement was to insure "that waiver would not be 
found from any particular set of facts unless it was clearly 
intended." Soters, Inc. at 940. Whether or not a party has 
waived a right is a highly fact-dependent question. Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smiths Food King and Drug 
Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 461 (Utah App. 1994), citing 
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah App. 1988) . 
The termination documents referred to by the court in its 
Memorandum Decision include a document simply styled 
uAgreement" executed by Smith and GCE by Denoyer on July 25, 
1992, and a second document styled "Resignation" signed July 
25, 1992. Both of those documents are included in the 
Addendum at pages 1498-1495 and 217. Neither of those 
documents contain language manifesting a distinctly made 
waiver by Smith of any rights, much less the description of an 
existing right, benefit or advantage, an acknowledgment by 
Smith of its existence and an expression of his intention to 
relinquish those rights. Cf. Soter at 940. First, as cited 
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above, tl: le Agreement" :i s perhaps best characterized as a 
statement of all of the terms of Smith's separation from GCE's 
employ and enterprise, The second document, "Resignation" 
merely acknowledges Siniti 1/ s resignation as the Vice 
President/Director of Grand Canyon Expeditions Company. See 
Addendum 217. In fact, the Appellees, who prepared the 
"Agreement , apparently knew what was required to articulate 
a waiver. In paragraph 9 on page 3 of the "Agreement" 
Appellees state "[t]he corporation hereby waives any right to 
enforce the provisions of the covenant not to compete set out 
in paragraph II.2 'Non-Competition' of the Employment 
Agreement executed by Smith on November 29, 1986 in favor of 
the corporation . . . ." See Addendum 331-324. No such 
language exists in either agreement distinctly manifesting 
Smith's waiver of any claims arising from his employment by 
GCE, or of any nature. The trial court's dismissal of Smith's 
claims based on the "termination documents" was therefore in 
error. 
xssues of Material fact exist whether Appellees' 
termination and buy-out of Smith constituted a 
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breach of contract and covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
The trial court in its January 15, 1999 Memorandum 
Decision recognized, in evaluating whether or not an issue of 
material fact existed regarding Smith's employment status, 
that u. . . the full airing of the evidence may establish that 
the relationship evolved into something which contemplated 
greater job security and permanency." See Addendum 815-807. 
In its ruling below, the court in addressing the Appellees' 
argument that Smith had not met his burden under Berube v. 
Fashion Centre Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), of 
establishing sufficient indicia of an implied in fact promise, 
concluded that "[t]he facts in this case have not been 
developed sufficiently for the Court to conclude as a matter 
of law that Plaintiff could not meet this burden." Finally, 
the trial court acknowledged that issues of material fact 
existed regarding whether or not the Appellees had cause to 
terminate Smith in July 1992. See Addendum 815-807. 
The evidence below did not show sufficient facts that an 
accord was reached between the parties, or that Smith waived 
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and released any of the claims he 1 lad as of July 25, 1992. 
Since, as the court below noted, issues of fact exd st as t : 
whether oi: not cause was required under the employment 
agreement: terminate Smith, whether cause existed to 
terminate Smith in July of 1992, the o:i :der • :>f the coin : t: be] o , 
dismissing Smith's claims under his employment agreement 
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
II. APPELLEES BREACHED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WHEN IT MISCALCULATED THE NET 
BOOK VALUE. 
A. No accord was reached of Smith's claims related tn 
GCE's net book value calculation 
The court below iiI its January 26, 2001 Memorandum 
Decision on the Appellees' third motion for summary judgment, 
final! :ispensed with Smith's claim '»f hi each arising from 
historic accounting practices by lumping it along with Smith's 
employment claim, and concluded that any claim under the stock 
buy-sell agreement related to the historic calculation is 
barred by the accord reached July 25, 1992. See Addendum 
2022-2011. For the reasons set forth in Section I.A. above of 
this brief, no accord was reached nor claim waived relating to 
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the historic accounting and failure to make that correction at 
the time of GCE and the individual Appellees' buy out of Smith 
in July 1992. At the very least, a question of fact exists as 
to whether or not an accord was reached or claim waived and 
Smith respectfully therefore requests that this matter be 
remanded to the trial court so that these matters can be 
considered by the jury. 
B. GCE's failure to adjust its historic accounting 
breached its covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Utah law governing the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts: 
Good faith performance or enforcement of a 
contract emphasizes faithfulness to an 
agreed common purpose and consistency with 
the justified expectations of the other 
party; it excludes a variety of types of 
conduct characterized as involving "bad 
faith" because they violate community 
standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 cmt.a (1979). See also 
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. , Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug 
Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 205 cmt. a (1979)), cert. 
denied, 899 P 2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
The covenant is a necessary part of most, if not all, 
contracts in Utah. See Andalex Resources, Inc. \ r. Myers, 871 
P. 2d 104] , 047 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . Whether there has been 
compliance with the covenant or duty depends upon the agreed 
common purpose and justified expectations of the parties, 
which is necessarily determined by the contract language, the 
conduct of the parties, and the course of dealings between 
them. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co, \r, St, Benedict's Hosp. , 
811 P. 2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991) . u [G] ood faith and fair dealing 
are fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a 
breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, 
generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law,"" 883 
P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Accord Cook v. Zions 
First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
To prevail on a claim of breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, a litigant need not show 
evidence, or in this case, Smith had no requirement of raising 
a genuine factual dispute, that the breaching party acted 
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unreasonable or in bad faith. Nor does a litigant have to 
show that the discretion afforded under a contract to one 
entity over the other was exercised unreasonably or in bad 
faith. The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires parties, 
particularly those vested with discretion over the other under 
terms of a contract, to exercise that discretion reasonably 
and in good faith. See Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 919 
P. 2d 56, 60 (Utah 1996) , citing Olympus Hills Shopping- Center 
v. Smiths Food and Drug Centers, 889 P. 2d 44 5, 450 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). This distinction, though subtle is significant. 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the 
party exercising discretion under a contract do so "for any 
purpose-including ordinary business purposes-reasonably within 
the contemplation of the parties.'' Olympus Hills at 451. The 
Olympus Hills court continues, " [a] contract thus would be 
breached by a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses 
its discretion for a reason outside the contemplated range-a 
reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a 
breach." Id. citing RESTATEMENT [2D] OF CONTRACTS, § 20 5 cmt.a 
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(1979). ("[gjouci faith performance of enforcement of a 
contract empha sizes faithfulness t o ai 1 agi e e d c ommon pu i :po s e 
and consistency with justified expectations of the other 
party"). 
C . Q a i c u ] _ a t i o r i o f t hie-! Mi'111!1 Ri. k "l| «:i 1 1:1 e • 
In exercising the discretion to fire Smith and to buy 
back his stock under the November 29, 1986 Buy Sell Agreement, 
GCE and the individual Appellees abused the J r discretion. 
Contrary to their obligation to exercise their discretion in 
favor of preserving the common purpose of maximizing value in 
a business in which they all owned stock 11 I• E ] r purpose 1 y 
undervalued GCE by relying on its historic accounting 
practices used for tax purposes in order to deprive Smith of 
his legitimate share of the value of h,i s stock. 
The Buy Sell Agreement grants GCE the "conclusive" 
discretion in determining the net book value of the 
corporation for purposes of determining the purchase price, 
limited only by generally accepted accounting principles. See 
Addendum 292. The sale of a shareholder's stock to GCE is 
mandated upon the termination of employment -tee 'Addendum 2 93 
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*fi 1 and 29lU 4. As Smith's stock represents his entire 
participation in the GCE enterprise, his expectation that GCE 
and the other participating Appellees in the Buy Sell 
Agreement not take any action which might artificially 
decrease the net book value is reasonable and justified. 
From its inception, GCE, through the auspices of its 
officers and directors and its accountant Mr. Willis, employed 
an accounting mechanism, the design of which was apparently to 
keep its net book value artificially low for tax purposes. 
See Addendum 1554:7-21. This commenced with the booking of $1 
million of the original $2,147 million purchase price as 
payment for the covenant not to compete of Ron Smith, and then 
by amortizing the covenant not to compete at $250,000 per year 
over the first four years of the existence of the corporation. 
See Derk Rasmussen's Affidavit, Addendum 1009 and 1007. GCE, 
from its inception, failed to recognize any value in the 
concession contracts purchased from Ron Smith in the 1986 
acquisition. See Addendum 1007-1006. Indeed, there has been 
no reflection in its financial statements of the value of the 
concession contracts, wherein lie the real value of the 
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corpor atioi i. See Addenc- . . . - The concession 
c on tracts are issued to an i n t en t i ona 1 ] y 1 i m i t e d nur nb e r o f 
outfitters authorized to take commercial river trips through 
the Grar. : anyon. Such contracts are required by law and 
limit the number of user days any outfitter may be ^n i he 
river. Without the concession contracts, no river runners, 
including GCE, can Lake commercial trips. In other words, 
without the contracts, GCE would have no business.1 
Generally accepted accounting principles allow for the 
capitalization of expenses incurred by GCE defending and 
renewing its National Park Service concession contracts. 
However, consistent with GCE's refusal to recognize any value 
in I:lie contracts, no such capitalization of GCE's substantial 
attorneys' fees and other expenses paid, to M:i : Skeei 1 ai :i d 
others in the renewal and defending of its U.S. Forest Service 
contracts were never capitalized. See Addendum 1003-1002. 
Remarkably, when GCE acquired the assets of 
Whitewater/Sobek, it booked an asset value of the concession 
contracts in the amount of $500,000.00. See Addendum 1558:22-
1557:1. 
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When GCE acquired the assets of Whitewater/Sobek and 
booked them in its consolidated financial statement for 
December 31, 1991, it, without justification, deleted $30,000 
from the booked asset value, entered an amount of $59,304 for 
depreciation, included a negative cash balance of $26,382 and 
included as a liability $113,618 for 1992 trip deposits 
without including a corresponding increase in the cash 
account. This conduct by GCE cut another $229,000 from the 
net book value as of the January of 1992. See Addendum 1005-
1004. 
GCE wrote off another $90,000 of the intangible assets of 
Whitewater/Sobek from November 1991 when they were acquired 
through June 30, 1992. Not only does this not comply with 
generally accepted accounting principles, but it further 
depletes the real net book value of GCE by about $88,750. See 
Addendum 1004-1003. 
As of the time Appellant was terminated in July of 1992, 
there was approximately $1,107,059.45 in prepaid 1992 trip 
deposits held by GCE in its liability account. Virtually none 
of those deposits had been recognized as income of GCE as of 
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July 1992, pv-Pii thougli CJCE was well into its 1992 season and 
even though GCE had paid $542,000 to ret:i re its long-ter t n note 
payable to Don Saunders in June of 1992. See Addendum 1001 f 
8 GCE's fa i 1 i nr e to recognize these substantial receipts, or 
at least a portion thereof to the extent of the business and 
expenses incurred, directly and negatively affected the net 
book value ad o! July 1LJ92„ 
Appellees argued in their second motion for summary 
judgment that Denoyer and Mathis are completely 
unsophisticated ..nancial and accounting matters and that 
they relied upon the accounting expertise of: the corporate 
accountant Mr. Willis. Defendant's memorandum in support of 
their second motion t<.o summary judgment was not included in 
the court's file prepared for this appeal. Relevant portions 
of the memorandum are included in the Supplement Addendum at 
2 072-2070 Don Saunders, on the other hand, was educated in 
accounting and spent his entire professional career either 
running his own accounting and bookkeeping firm or as the 
Chief Financial Office*, of Bayliner Marine and several other 
innumerable entities affiliated with that V, noo-employee 
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enterprise. See Supplemental Addendum 2077-2073. GCE's 
accountant Mr. Willis swore in an affidavit below that "at no 
time has any officer, director, or shareholder of GCE engaged 
in acts or omissions to manipulate the financial status of 
GCE, nor have they made any attempt to reduce [Smith's] 
proportionate share of the company or reduced the purchase 
price of his stock at the time GCE purchased it." See 
Addendum 1641-1640. Aside from being saturated with hearsay, 
Mr. Willis' statement is not borne out by GCE's own financial 
documents. 
The November 29, 198 6 Buy Sell Agreement not only gives 
GCE discretion but provides that GCE's discretion is 
"conclusive" in the determination of the price to be paid for 
the shares of stock of the terminated employee. Given this 
unfettered final discretion, the principles of good faith and 
fair dealing are of critical application. Smith, as any 
terminated shareholder, may justifiably expect to be 
compensated for his share of the real value of GCE. The 
record below, including GCE's financial records, creates 
several issues of fact directly related to GCE's history 
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accounting practices and the substantial negative impact they 
had on the calculation, of net book val i le as of J\ lly ] 0 02, as 
well as the question of whether the conduct of GCE and the 
individual Appellees comported with their obligations of good 
faith and fair dealing under the buy-se] ] agreement . The 
evidence supports Smith's claim that Appellees breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the buy-
sell agreement when they failed to correct hi stori c accounti i i g 
practices so the calculation actually reflected GCE's value as 
of July 1992. 
III. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED M M-N I- f]V liAMAOK'-
PROVED AT TRIAL. 
A claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing sounds in contract rather than tort and in 
and of itself will not entitle a claimant to punitive damages. 
E.g. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1167 
(Utah 1983). However, punitive damages can be awarded in a 
contract action where the elements of a separate tort are 
established. Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., Ill P. 2d 325 (Utah 1988). Ii I tl: le i i istai it case, Smith has 
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plead and produced evidence that Denoyer and Mathis 
intentionally, wilfully, if not recklessly undertook to learn 
the operation of the business from Smith and then terminate 
his involvement as an employee and shareholder. See 
Supplemental Addendum 2079-2078. Further, Smith was 
wrongfully deprived of the economic value of his interest in 
GCE when he was forced by Appellees in concert to sell his 
stock for a price which was based on an artificially low 
valuation of GCE, See Addendum 293-291. The purpose of 
punitive damages is to punish and deter intentional acts of 
misconduct such as those alleged to have been engaged in by 
Appellees in this case. See Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
959 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1998) (Justice Russon, dissenting) . 
Viewed against the backdrop of Utah R.Civ. P. 54(c) (1) , which 
provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings," the Utah Supreme Court has gone so far as to state 
that an award of punitive damages may obtain even when not 
plead and without a formal amendment of pleadings. "If the 
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plaintiff were able t; n adduce the necessary foundational 
evidence at trial, she could claim punitive damages iinder Riile 
54(c) . " Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp. Inc., 675 P.2d 
1175, 1181 82 (Utah 1983) (quoting 6 .J Moore, W Taggart and 
J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice, "f 54.60 at: 1212-14 (2d 
Ed. 1983)). Smith should therefore not be precluded by a 
ruling of si immar> judgment from presenting evidence, and if 
such evidence supports such an award, from recover ' - ;: * i in:i tive 
damages at trial. The court therefore erred .:. granting 
Appellees' motion in legaid l.> Smith's claim :or punitive 
damages. 
VI A REASONABLE EXTENSION OF UTAH CASE LAW JUSTIFIES 
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING TN THIS CASE, 
Under ceratin circumstances, the Utah Supreme Coi irt has 
permitted recovery of attorneys' fees as consequential damages 
in claims of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. See Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 
420 (Utah 1989). The Court states, "Canyon Country's claim 
for recovery of fees was predicated on the theory that 
attorney fees were an item of consequential damages flowing 
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from the insurers' breach of contract. This is a legitimate 
theory of damages, as the trial court recognized." Id. The 
language of the court did not expressly limit its decision 
only to actions based on an insurer's breach of contract. 
But the court, in fact, disregarded such a limitation when it 
extended the "broad range of recoverable damages for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing" to include 
attorneys' fees in employment claims. See Heslop v. Bank of 
Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1992). 
The award of attorneys' fees is within the discretion of 
the trial court and determined based on evidence presented at 
trial. See, e.g. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P. 2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 
1993) (attorneys' fees are in the discretion of the trial 
court); Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., 806 P.2d 200, 
204 (Utah App. 1990) (failure to present evidence at trial 
results in no award of attorneys' fees). The evidence below 
is that Smith, as an employee and participant in the GCE 
venture with Denoyer, Mathis and Saunders was subject to 
termination from employment and exclusion from participation 
in GCE upon the decision of any two of the participating 
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owners/empl oyees/directors , Further, 1 :i Is stock was subject to 
immediate liquidation, with the determination of the purchase 
price to be made in the sole and conclusive discretion of GCE 
and its accountant. ;s'ee Addendum 2 93-2 91 Not unlike the 
circumstances in Canyon Country v. Bracey, where the Supreme 
Court recognized that attorneys' fees as a type of 
consequential damages was a legitimate theory of damages, the 
nature of the relationship between Smith, GCE and 1:1le 
individual Appellees in light of the latter's discretion and 
control over his employment, the: r discretion and control over 
the forced acquisition of his shares of stock and their 
discretion and control over the determination of the value of 
the purchase price of such stock is analogous to the 
relationship between an insurer and an insured where the 
insurer has little or no ability to negotiate provisions of 
its terms of insurance or over Mnr- handling aud paying of 
claims. See Canyon Country Store at 419-420. Similarly, in 
Heslop, where the court, citing Beru£>e v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) for the proposition that 
"consequential damages are 'those reasonably within the 
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contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at 
the time the contract was made'", Heslop at 840, noted where 
a party to an employment agreement finds itself in a 
"particularly vulnerable position once the employer breaches 
the employment agreement xv consequential damages 
including attorneys' fees could be reasonably foreseeable by 
the employer under the circumstances of the employer's 
wrongful termination. Id. at 840-841. Like Heslop, Smith 
upon his precipitous termination and concomitant forced buy 
out of his stock in the enterprise, was left with no option 
but to file suit to enforce his employment contract as well as 
the buy-sell agreement and consequently would foreseeably be 
required to incur attorneys' fees. Cf. Heslop at 841. The 
evidence submitted during the summary judgment proceedings in 
this case to the court below therefore justified allowing 
Smith's claim for attorneys' fees as consequential damages. 
The court below erred, therefore, in granting Appellees' 
motion for summary judgment on the question of Smith's claim 
for attorneys' fees. 
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'IT SMITH IS ENTITLED TO AMEND HIS
 C0MPLAINT TO INCLUDE 
AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
The trial court is granted the discretion to determine 
whether or not to allow leave to a party litigant to amend the 
pleadings to conform with the evidence . See Utah R, C:i v. P. 
15(b) . An alternative theory of recovery in light of Smith's 
contract claims includes unjust enrichment if Smith can show 
(1) a benefit is conferred on one person by another; (2) the 
conferree appreciates or has knowledge of the benefit; and, 
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferred is under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitab] e foi: the conferree » 
retain the benefit without payment of its value. See American 
Towers Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 
1192 (Utah 19 96). In America n Towei s the coi ir t continued, 
u[i]n other words, the remedy is one of restitution designed 
to restore a plaintiff a benefit unjustly enjoyed by a 
defendant." Id. "The doctrine is designed t: provide an 
equitable remedy where one does not exist at law. In other 
words, if a legal remedy is available, such as a breach of an 
express contract, the law will not :i i: i ip] ;\l: r the equitable remedy 
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of unjust enrichment." [citations omitted] Id. at 1192. 
Smith sought the alternative equitable theory of unjust 
enrichment if the court below were to have concluded that 
there was no legal basis to seek recovery of a portion of the 
refund by GCE of the Arizona amusement tax under the November 
29, 1986 buy-sell agreement. 
In response to Smith's second set of interrogatories on 
about March 1, 1999, the Appellees first disclosed that GCE 
received a "refund of $907,916.94 in three payments in late 
1995 or early 1996" of an Arizona amusement tax assessed GCE 
from 19 86 through 19 92. See Addendum 918-917, Interrogatory 
No. 6. On about March 18, 1999, Smith first had the 
opportunity to inspect some of GCE's records related to the 
refund. GCE disclosed that it refunded to its customers a 
small percentage of the refund, and treated the balance, uas 
corporate income during the quarter it was received." See 
Addendum 917-915, Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 11. 
The Arizona amusement tax was collected from GCE as a 
concessionaire running trips through the Grand Canyon from 
1986 through 1992. A portion of all revenue generated by GCE 
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during that period was paid to the state of Arizona. GCE 
retained counsel who pursued the claim with the state of 
Arizona until finally recovering the full refund by 1996. The 
Affidavit of Ann M. Dumenil, counsel for GCE is included in 
the Addendum at pages 1756-1751. It is undisputed that GCE 
received a refund from approximately $907,916.94 by early 
1996. It is also undisputed that the refund was of an 
amusement tax collected during the period of Smith's ownership 
from 1986 through 1992. It is also undisputed that at the 
time of the Appellees' forced buy out of Smith's stock, the 
net book value of the corporation was determined to be 
approximately $750,000.00. It is undisputed that GCE treated 
the refund as corporate income. See Addendum 917-916, 
Interrogatory No. 9. The refund constitutes an asset 
developed during Smith's ownership of GCE. That value was not 
included in the determination of his net book value in July 
1992. When it was paid and realized by GCE in 1995 and 1996 
it constituted a benefit bestowed on GCE and the other 
Appellees at Smith's expense. Finally, it is undisputed that 
GCE appreciates and has knowledge of the Arizona amusement tax 
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\Appellantbrief.fin.wpd 4 7 
refund. If GCE and the other Appellees were allowed to keep 
the refund of the tax collected and taken from GCE during 
Smith's ownership, without paying him for his pro rated share, 
a substantial inequity would occur. The inequity would exceed 
in value the total amount paid Smith during his forced buy out 
for his shares of GCE in 1992. 
The undisputed facts support a basis for allowing Smith 
leave to amend his complaint to assert an alternative unjust 
enrichment claim. The court below erred in denying Smith's 
motion for leave to amend. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and law, Smith respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal 
of his claims arising from his employment with GCE, reverse 
its dismissal of Smith's good faith and fair dealing claim 
based on Appellees' failure to make generally acceptable 
accounting adjustments in their determination of net book 
value at the time of the buy out, and reverse the trial 
court's dismissal of Smith's claim for punitive damages and 
attorneys' fees. 
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DATED this ^ 4 day of April, 2 002. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
By:. 
BENSON L. HAfHAWAY, JR. 
CORBIN B. GORDON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
and Cross/Appellee 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Did that also decrease over time? That is, her 
3 visits to the office? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q, Did the tension between Marc and Ron continue 
6 after the sale? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Would you characterize it as getting worse, 
9 better or about the same? 
10 A. I would say probably a little worse. 
11 Q. Okay. And how was it that this worsening of the 
12 tension manifested itself to you? What things did you 
13 notice -
14 A. Ron started coming into the office less. When 
15 he did come in, Ron - Marc would either - he would get up 
16 and leave. 
17 Q. Did it manifest itself in any other ways to you? 
18 A, Not that I'm aware of. 
19 Q. Okay. Did you attribute Ron coming into the 
20 office less to this poor relationship he had with his 
21 brother? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Between 1986 and 1992, when Marc left the employ 
24 of Grand Canyon, did you ever discuss with Marc his 
25 relationship with Ron? 
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1 A. Pardon? 
2 Q. Between 1986 and mid 1992 - July, 1992, when 
3 Marc was separated from the company, did you ever discuss 
4 with Marc the - this tension between himself and Ron? 
5 A. I donl recall discussing it with Marc. I may 
6 have. Idonl recall it right-I may have. I don't 
7 really recall it. 
8 Q. Do you recall discussing it with Ron during that 
9 same time frame? 
10 A. Very-yes. 
11 Q. Okay. And what do you recall discussing with 
12 Ron in that connection? 
13 A. He still really didnl know why Marc was so 
14 upset with him. I think he felt like he had tried to talk 
15 to - to Marc and was unable to talk with him. 
16 Q. Was this something that Ron communicated to you 
17 in a personal conversation face-to-face? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Do you recall having more than one conversation 
20 with Mr. Smith about that? 
21 A. I think so. 
22 Q. Could you, as you sit here today, assign any 
23 time period to one or more of those conversations? In 
24 other words, it occurred in this year or that year? 
25 A. I cant say specifically what year. It was 
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1 after the sale of the company, probably in - in probably 
2 the first or second year. 
3 Q, Do you remember anything else about the 
4 substance of those conversations with Mr, Smith about the 
5 poor relationship he had with Marc Smith? 
6 A. It also caused a very poor relationship with the 
7 other - with his family, of course - with his brothers 
8 and sisters. It - it destroyed his family relationship 
9 with the rest of his family. 
10 Q. And why do you feel that way? 
11 A. It was because they felt that Ron had not 
12 treated Marc fairly, I guess, in the sale of the company. 
13 Q. Did you feel that Ron had not treated Marc 
14 fairly in - in terms of the sale of the company? 
115 A. I - he let everyone know he was selling the 
116 company. I can't say that - and I don't - and as far as 
17 I knew, there was no agreement between the two brothers 
18 as - that he would have part - you know, other than that 
19 he tried to make a place for him in the company when the 
20 company sold. 
t21 Q. Okay. Was it your understanding that Ron Smith 
22 had tried to make a place for Marc in the new company? 
;23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. On what basis did you understand that? 
25 A. That he was going to be one of the partners in 
29 
! 1 the company. 
| 2 Q. All right. What understanding did you have as 
| 3 to Ron Smith's role in - in securing a place in the new 
4 company for Marc Smith? 
5 A. If it hadn't have been for Ron Smith doing it, 
I 6 it wouldn't have happened. 
7 Q. How do you know that? 
8 A. Because the other two members of it didn't 
9 really - really want a third member or a third partner. 
10 Q. And the other two members you're referring to 
11 would be Mr. DeNoyer and Mr. Mathis? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. And you said that the other two did not want a 
14 third partner, is that right? 
15 A. That's right. 
16 Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. DeNoyer 
17 or Mr. Mathis when they indicated as much to you? 
18 A. I was sitting in the room when they discussed it 
19 right after the sale of the business. Marty was very 
20 disappointed. He did not want to have a third partner. 
21 And Michael just said, "We'll deal with it." 
22 Q. And this was in - at the end of 1986, after the 
23 business sold? 
24 A. Yes. Shortly thereafter. Just when the papers 
25 were being finalized. 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL .DISTRICT COURT . 




GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO., 
MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL DENOYER, ) 
RONALD R. SMITH, DONALD SAUNDERS, ) 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5 AND JANE ) 




• > ' . - ' ' ' - ' -
) CASE NO. 940600003 
) • * 
DEPOSITION OF DON SAUNDERS 
TAKEN; APRIL 18, 1997 
CONDENSED TRANSCRIPT/INDEX 
File No. 41897 
Reported- By: 
VTPT T v arwucurcinrTTT r i* r*r*-n 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 
5980 South Fashion Blvd. 





1 D e p o s i t i o n o f DONALD A. SAUNDERS, taken on b e h a l f of 
2 P l a i n t i f f , a t 920 Hi ldebrand Ln. N . E . , B a i n b r i d g e 
3 I s l a n d , Washington, on A p r i l 18 , 1997 , commencing a t 
| 4 8 :00 a . m . , b e f o r e KELLY SOMMERVILLE, R e g i s t e r e d 
5 P r o f e s s i o n a l R e p o r t e r and Notary P u b l i c i n and f o r the 







FOR THE PLAINTIFF: STIRBA 6 HATHAWAY 
13 BY: BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. 
215 S o . S t a t e S t . , S u i t e 1150 
14 S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 84111 
15 
16 FOR THE DEFENDANT: VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL t MCCARTHY 
17 BY: JOHN ANDERSON 
50 S o . Main S t . , S u i t e 1600 
18 S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84144 
19 VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
20 BY: RICHARD C. SKEEN 
50 S o . Main S t . , S u i t e 1600 
21 S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84144 1 







I N D E X 
1 4 
WITNESS EXAMINATION BY PAGE 





11 EXHIBITS: REFERRED TO: 

































































Salt Lake City, Utah, April 18, 1997, 8:00 a.m. 
DONALD A. SAUNDERS, 
was duly sworn, was examined and 
1 testified as follows: 
BY MR. HATHAWAY: 
Q. Don, would you state and spell your full name 
for the record for us? 
A. Donald, D-o-n-a-l-d, Arthur, A-r-t-h-u-r 
Saunders, S-a-u-n-d-e-r-s. 
Q. What's your address? 
A. 5261 Battle Point Drive NE, Bainbridge Island, 
Washington 98110. 
Q. How long now have you lived on Bainbridge 
Island? 
A. Year and-a-half. 
Q. Do you still have a residence in Arlington, 
Washington? 
A. No. 
Q. Sold that place? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is your birth date? 
A. 7/25/34. 
Q. Give me an idea if you would, Don, as to your 
educational background. 
A. I graduated from Lake Washington High School 
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and then I did about 200 credit hours at University of 
Washington but I didn't technically graduate in 
accounting. I took a lot of accounting courses and 
various other courses that I felt would further my 
accounting background. I was in public accounting 
business at the time, but I didn't need a certificate 
because I was in business with my father. 
Q. What did your father do? 
A. He was a public accountant. 
Q. So you were working with him doing those types 
of things? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was it that you finished any formal 
education at University of Washington? 
A. Probably the last regular course, see, I've 
taken courses there. I guess I don't know what you mean 
by formal I kept taking courses off and on for, you 
know, where they had seminars and different things like 
that for years. 
Q. Did you? 
A. 20 years, yeah. 
Q. Yeah. 
A. And other places, you know, that I did some. 
Q. Have you ever received any certificates? 
A. No. ! 
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1 Q. No graduation diploma? 
2 A. From the university? 
,. 3 Q. Right 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. And you're not a C.P.A.? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Were you born in Washington? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Whereabouts? 
10 A. Seattle. 
11 Q. Lived here all your life? 
12 A. Yes, uh-huh, lived in the state of Washington 
13 all my life. 
14 Q. Tell me if you would, Don, briefly about your 
15 employment background starting from this point in time 
16 when you were employed with your father. 
117 A. I worked for my father for a few years, then as 
118 a partner with my father for a few years, and then my 
19 father retired and I ran the practice for a couple 
20 years, and then I sold the practice and became the 
21 financial officer for a boat building company. 
22 Q. That was Bayliner Boats as I understand it? 
23 A. Yes, uh-huh. 
24 Q. When did you sell the practice? 
25 A. In about September of f72. 
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1 Q. What was the practice known as at the time you 
2 sold it? 
3 A. Saunders Accounting and Bookkeeping. 
4 Q. During your work with Saunders Accounting and 
5 Bookkeeping, was Bayliner one of your customers, 
6 clients? 
7 A. Well, maybe we better distinguish on Bayliner. 
8 It started out as Puget Advanced Outboard Marine, 
9 Advanced Outboard went to Advanced Outboard Marine, went 
10 to Puget Plastics, went to some different names but 
11 for - we could just for simplicity purposes say 
12 Bayliner. Bayliner was the name of the boats the 
13 company built. 
14 Q. I understand. 
15 A. And so it's commonly known as that. The 
16 corporate names were different things as well through 
17 the years. 
18 Q. What was the corporate name at the time you 
19 became involved as the chief financial officer? 
20 A. By then it was Bayliner Marine. 
21 Q. And that was about in 1972? 
22 A. '72, yes. I had for a number of years before 
23 that done all our accounting and our office had done all 
24 the payrolls and payables and everything for what was to 
25 become eventually Bayliner Marine. 
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1 Q. How many employees were there at Saunders 
2 Accounting and Bookkeeping at the time you sold it? 
3 A. Five. 
4 Q. Why don't you describe for us what you did 
5 after going to work for Bayliner as the chief financial 
6 officer. 
7 A. When I went to work for Bayliner, I handled all 
8 of the financial matters, the trucking department, the 
9 — all the computer operations, the health, accident, 
10 all those types of things, all the employee benefit 
11 programs. All of the hiring policies and hiring of all 
12 the people were in my departments. I used to say it was 
13 everything the other guys didn't want to do actually 
14 there, but anyway, those types of things. I got 
15 involved in manufacturing from time to time and in 
16 the - somewhat in the design of the boats, pretty much 
17 the whole thing. 
18 Eventually, by 1976 there was the five people who 
19 eventually were the owners of the company, myself and 
20 three other guys. We had lunch together every day and 
21 we, between the four of us, we pretty much basically ran 
22 the company under us because we were - if everybody was 
23 in town eating lunch together every day, we got involved 
24 in each other's parts of the business. So I was 
25 involved in everything, but primarily the parts I named. 
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1 Q. When did you become an owner in this entity 
2 that became Bayliner Boats? 
3 A. When I sold my accounting practice. The owner, 
4 the person at that time that basically owned the whole 
5 thing, Orin Edson, said he was going to have to get a 
6 financial officer to come in and work in the company if 
7 I wouldn't sell my accounting practice and go to work 
8 for him. And so I made him a deal where he'd sell me 
9 part of the company if I sold the accounting practice 
10 and go to work for him simply because I was a little 
11 bored with the accounting. It's the same old thing 
12 every day. Bayliner was exciting and it was growing., I 
13 knew I was taking a pretty good risk, but I just was 
14 really impressed with it because my accounting practice, 
15 the year I sold it, which brought it to a head was I had 
16 taken two months off my practice. I had about a hundred 
17 clients and it ran so smooth and was so good I'd just 
18 take the summer off and tour around the country with my 
19 kids. And while I was gone the two months they'd got in 
20 some problems with personnel and everything at Bayliner, 
21 so when I got back Orin says, Don, God, I've got to have 
22 you do that. That was one of my very wise decisions and 
23 I got rid of it. 
24 Q. What percentage did you buy? 
25 A. It varied and I bought more later. You know, I 
r W T n R l * M O T T X T T A TXT r*f\TTT%nr> YlTITtS^T+rmrmr*** ^~ 
I Page 10 
1 can't remember what percentage that was. Eventually I 
2 owned about four percent of Bayliner. 
.3 Q. Was Bayliner a publicly traded corporation? 
4 A. No. When we sold the company in 1986, there 
5 were four stockholders, two other people with the same 
6 stock as me and then a majority. Orin owned the 
7 majority. 
I 8 Q. Who were the four shareholders with you? 
9 A. Vinton Sommerville, David Livingston, and J. 
10 OrinEdson. 
; 11 Q. J. Orin Edson, and I take it from your prior 
12 statements that he was the primary -
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. — shareholder? 
15 A. Yes. He'd started the original company which 
16 sold used outboards in Seattle. 
17 Q. And he sold to the Brunswick Corporation, 
18 correct? 
19 A. We sold to the Brunswick. 
20 Q. I 'm sorry, you sold. 
21 A. Uh-huh. 
22 Q. Brunswick, they still own Bayliner, don't they? 
23 A. Yes. And there was a number of names. It 
24 wasn't just Bayliner. Bayliner was the biggest 
|25 product. We had other companies within it. We had 
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1 bought Chrysler Marine Corporation. You know, we had 
2 other boat companies that were — Blue Fin Aluminum 
3 Boats, things like that, but Bayliner basically, yes, 
4 that's what we sold. 
5 Q. Can you tell me what the other entities were 
6 that was part of that deal? 
7 A. I can't remember. There's lots of them. I'd 
8 have to go through the records and look. 
9 Q. But they were all included in your four percent 
10 ownership of the stock in this entity? 
11 A. Yes. They were all part of it. Originally 
12 there was, you know, back in the early '70s, the common 
13 thing was you keep a bunch of different corporations and 
14 eventually we'd put them all together because you didn't 
15 have any tax advantage and it got messy and everything 
16 was one corporation. So finally as we bought any other 
17 boat company we just took the assets and we didn't do 
18 the corporations and stuff. 
19 Q. Of the four shareholders of the company, who 
20 was most involved in these acquisitions and handling — 
21 at least the way these other business entities or 
22 enterprises you described were handled and incorporated 
23 into the business? 
24 A. Orin Edson and I. If it was a large one, we'd 
25 generally negotiate it together because we'd play ping 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS*263-
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1 pong with the purchasers, you know. And then if it was, 
2 you know, not a major deal, you know, we're buying a 
3 200,000 square foot plant or something in Mississippi, I 
4 might go negotiate it myself or whatever. 
5 Q. Once you made the determination in this prior 
6 entity to acquire an asset or to acquire an enterprise, 
7 who was it that set up the actual structure, by the 
8 Bayliner group or Bayliner company for lack of a better 
9 name, to handle that new enterprise? 
10 A. I don't understand your question. 
II Q. Well, you testified that in the ' 70s 
12 everybody - you used to set up the subsidiaries — 
13 A. Uh-huh, right. 
14 Q. — for other corporations that were involved 
15 and ultimately there was no tax advantage to doing that 
16 so you brought all the businesses in? 
17 A. Sure, yep. 
18 Q. As these acquisitions were subsequently made, 
19 were they just purchased in the name of this Bayliner 
20 company? 
21 A. Yep, uh-huh. 
22 Q. Were any of the four or the three remaining 
23 shareholders involved at all with you directly in the 
24 aspects of the business you described, you were involved 
25 in primarily the accounting business? 
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1 A. To some extent. Again, we ate lunch together 
2 every day. 
3 Q. It was an oversight kind of function? 
4 A. Yeah. We'd talk about that and then we -
5 every Monday night we had a meeting for three or four 
6 hours and that also included - and the lunch included 
7 maybe three other key personalities. It would vary from 
8 one to four as time went on, but it involved other 
9 people. We were just together. I mean, we — and our 
10 offices were all in a row in the offices, you know, so 
ill we saw each other lots. j 
12 Q. You talked on a regular basis? . ! 
13 A Yeah. 
14 Q. When you sold Baylienr in 1986, how many 
15 employees did Bayliner have? 
16 A. About 7,000. 
17 Q. How many employees would you consider at least 
18 as of 1986 when you sold the business to have been in a 
19 management sort of a position? 
20 A. In some type of management, do you consider a 
21 leadman, is he a management person? 
22 Q. That's a broad question. 
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. Were there other employees of the entity 
25 besides the four of you which you considered to be key 
596 Page 10 - Page 13 
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1 personnel involved in the operation of the business? 
2 A. Many. 
.3 Q. Many? 
4 A. We had 7,000 employees. There was many, many, 
5 many. 
6 Q. Was there a core group of decision makers for 
7 the company besides the four of you? 
8 A. Yes. The other people that went to like lunch 
9 with us and met in our Monday night meeting were part of 
10 that core group. The guy that ran our marketing or I 
11 mean, actually our advertising department, 
12 communications we called it, the guy that was the 
13 bruntman as far as all the manufacturing operations. 
14 Oh, various other people. There was probably 30 key 
15 people. There was probably 30 people say in 1986 that 
16 earned more than 100,000 a year and those are fairly -
17 at that time that would be like a quarter of a million 
18 today. Those were fairly key management people who 
19 worked with us. 
20 Q. Was there ever a point in time that the four of 
21 you that owned and ultimately controlled the company had 
22 disagreements about how to handle certain aspects of the 
23 business? 
24 A. Yeah, occasionally, uh-huh. 
25 Q. Is it fair to say that that wasn't something 
_ _ _ 
1 that necessarily was uncommon? 
2 MR. ANDERSON: I'll object to the question. That's 
3 overbroad. 
4 THE WITNESS: Well, actually it was - it was very 
5 uncommon in our company. 
6 BY MR. HATHAWAY: 
7 Q. How about within this group of 30 core people, 
8 was it - I take it that some of those may have been 
9 involved in generally the same aspect of the business? 
10 A. Yes, uh-huh. 
11 Q. In your experience with Bayliner Corporation, 
12 isn't it true that on occasion disputes arise as to how 
13 to handle the operation of the business? 
14 A. Not that I can really call disputes. We paid 
15 our help extremely well Probably our key people were 
16 getting twice as much as anybody else in the industry. 
17 We never had anybody stolen from us because everybody 
18 would think I can't pay this guy that kind of money, so 
19 we didn't have that kind of problem, so we had the very 
20 best. So we, I mean, it was rare that I can ever 
21 remember any disputes among the people. I mean, we had 
22 the best and they worked it out and they were 
23 reasonable. We didn't have that kind of problem. 
24 It's like you ask the question about Orin, Slim, and 
25 Dave and I getting at each other. I don't remember but 
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1 two times that we had over 18 years we really had any, 
2 you know, really dispute that I had to kind of mediate 
3 in the middle of you might say over that many years. So 
4 there wasn't a lot. We were - our business was making 
5 money and we concentrated on that. We didn't have a lot 
6 of infighting in the company. We didn't have - we were 
7 very untypical of a very large company, you know, or 
8 large company because we didn't have a bunch of 
9 politicking going on, and that's where you get all of 
10 this infighting, you know. We didn't have it. I mean, 
11 we paid our people well and we kept them real busy and 
12 it's like I always said, just run the office short of 
13 people so they don't have time to get their little 
14 political groups together. So we didn't have it. It 
15 was a really rare incidence. 
16 Q. What have you done professionally since 1986 
17 when you sold the business? 
18 A. Professionally, nothing. 
19 Q. Nothing. 
20 A. I have businesses that other people --1 mean, 
21 it's like this, I don't get involved in them. I'm very 
22 careful to stay kind of distanced from anything because 
23 I don't want any involvement in my company. 
24 Q. Tell me if you would, Don, what businesses 
25 you've got going besides the Grand Canyon Expeditions? 
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1 A. Let's see, right now, I believe I don't have 
2 any except a land development company and GCE. I have 
3 another corporation I guess it's got some land in it but 
4 it's not very active. My land development company has 
5 quite a bit. I have a son-in-law that runs that. 
6 Q. What's the name of that company? 
I 7 A. It's SK. Enterprises Company or it's Donald -
] 8 Don Saunders DBA. It's not a corporation. 
j 9 Q. And I take it you're not in any way involved in 
10 the management or operation of the business of the 
11 entity? 
12 A. I've been one time in the last few years just 
13 on one piece of property where they were having some 
14 problems selling it, and I got in with the guys that 
15 were buying it and negotiated the sale price. 
16 Q. What sort of development do they do? 
17 A. Vacant lands, 300 acre lots, 1000 acre lots, 
18 5000 acre lots, that kind of property. 
19 Q. Is this recreational property? 
20 A. Residential. 
21 Q. Residential, so estate-type lots? 
22 A. Yeah, uh-huh. 
23 Q. Whereabouts are they operating? 
24 A. Snohomish County in the state of Washington. 
25 Q. Maybe you better spell Snohomish. 
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Defendants Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. ("Grand Canyon" or the "Company"), 
Donald Saunders ("Saunders"), Michael Denoyer ("Denoyer"), and Martin Mathis ("Mathis") 
(collectively referred to as "Defendants") submit the following points and authorities in 
support of their motion for summary judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment on all claims for relief set forth 
in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. The court granted partial summary judgment to 
Defendants, dismissing the first claim for relief in its entirety and the second claim for relief in 
SLCl-47481.2 33714-0001 
attorney, Mr. Skeen, that Plaintiffs stock was being purchased and he would need to prepare a 
buy-out amount consistent with the Buy/Sell Agreement. LL 
Denoyer and Mathis were completely unsophisticated in financial and accounting 
matters. They relied upon the accounting expertise of the Company's accountant Mr. Willis. 
Mr. Willis has attested that there was no manipulation of the books and records of Grand 
Canyon to create an artificially low buy-out amount for Plaintiff. LL 1f 22. Moreover, this 
theory is seriously undermined by the fact that Plaintiff, in essence, dictated the timing of his 
departure.4 
Plaintiffs counsel also appears to be under the mistaken impression that Grand 
Canyon's investment in White Water mysteriously disappeared in the consolidated financial 
statement prepared by Mr. Willis. In fact, the investment appears in the asset column of White 
Water that is added to Grand Canyon's assets. See Exs. "F", MG", and "H". Counsel's 
libelous suggestion that Grand Canyon engaged in income tax fraud through erasure is 
unsupported by any factual evidence and simply indicates the depths to which counsel will sink 
to manufacture an illusory issue of fact. See Plaintiff's counsel's letter to Court dated January 
18, 1999 (attached hereto as Exhibit "R"). 
Plaintiffs counsel has also misrepresented to the Court previously that Grand Canyon's 
financial condition was worse in July 1992 than at any point in the history of the Company. 
As noted at the last hearing, and confirmed through Mr. Willis' Affidavit and the data 
available to Plaintiffs counsel, Grand Canyon's position was significantly better in July 1992 
4
 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff demanded that his employment 
difficulties with Grand Canyon be resolved during the 1992 rafting season, rather than thereafter 
as Denoyer and Grand Canyon would have preferred. See Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 1998 (citing deposition testimony). 
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June 28, 2001. 
Commercial tenants filed declaratory judgment 
action asking court to interpret lease provision 
regarding monthly rental rate. Landlord 
counterclaimed for breach of lease and unlawful 
detainer. After jury trial, the Third District Court, 
Coalville Department, Robert K. Hilder and Pat B. 
Brian, JJ., entered judgment for landlord in amount of 
$8,730. Tenants appealed, and landlord cross-
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: 
(1) jury's special verdict was not advisory, and thus 
trial court was bound by jury's findings; (2) accord and 
satisfaction precluded finding of unlawful detainer; (3) 
waiver provision in lease did not preclude finding of 
accord and satisfaction; (4) landlord was entitled to 
administrative fees; (5) landlord was not entitled to late 
fees; and (6) remand was necessary to determine 
prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
[1] Appeal and Error <®^ > 1078(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(K) Error Waived in Appellate Court 
30kl078 Failure to Urge Objections 
30kl078(l) In General 
Tenants could raise issue of accord and satisfaction 
on appeal, even though issue was not raised in 
pleadings, as record showed that evidence regarding 
existence of accord and satisfaction was presented at 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 
Pagel 
trial, jury was instructed on and made findings of fact 
that supported accord and satisfaction, and landlord had 
opportunity to prepare and meet issue. Rules CivProc., 
Rule 15(b). 
[2] Pleading <®=»427 
302 — 
302XVIII Waiver or Cure of Defects and 
Objections 
302k427 Objections to Evidence as Not Within 
Issues. 
If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide the issue 
and deem the pleadings amended even if the issue was 
not originally pleaded, and whether the pleadings may 
be deemed amended depends on whether the opposing 
party had a fair opportunity to prepare and meet the 
issue. 
[3] Appeal and Error <@==>498.1 
30 — 
30X Record 
30X(A) Matters to Be Shown 
30k498 Presentation and Reservation of 
Grounds of Review 
30k498.1 In General. 
Commercial tenants who appealed from jury's 
special verdict were not required to provide transcript 
of proceedings below or marshal evidence, as tenants 
were not challenging findings of fact but trial court's 
application of law to jury's special verdict findings. 
[4] Declaratory Judgment <©^369 
118A — 
118 AHI Proceedings 
118 AHI(F) Hearing and Determination 
118Ak369 Verdict and Findings. 
Jury's special verdict in declaratory judgment action 
brought by tenants against landlord was not advisory, 
and thus trial court was bound by jury's findings, as 
both parties pursued legal, not equitable claims, tenants 
demanded jury trial on claims, and trial court did not 
inform parties or jury that jury was merely advisory. 
Rules CivProc., Rule 49(a). 
[5] Trial <®= 3^47 
388 — 
388IX Verdict 
388K(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings 
388k346 Power of Jury to Find Specially 
388k347 Special Verdict. 
In the case of a special verdict, the jury only finds 
the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and 
renders the verdict. 
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[6] Accord and Satisfaction <©=> 10(1) 
8 — 
8k6 Part Payment 
8kl0 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims 
8kl0(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[6] Accord and Satisfaction <®^ > 11(2) 
8 — 
8k6 Part Payment 
8kll Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment in 
Full 
8kl 1(2) Remittances on Condition. 
Accord and satisfaction was established in dispute 
between commercial tenant and landlord as to rental 
rate, and thus tenants were not in unlawful detainer, 
where jury found a good faith agreement over amount 
due under lease, payments tendered were made in foil 
satisfaction of disputed rent, and landlord negotiated 
check, which contained notation that amount was for 
new base rent. 
[7] Accord and Satisfaction <®^ 1 
8 — 
8kl Nature and Requisites in General. 
To establish an accord and satisfaction, three 
elements must be present: (1) an unliquidated claim or 
a bona fide dispute over the amount due, (2) a payment 
offered as full settlement of the entire dispute, and (3) 
an acceptance of the payment as Ml settlement of the 
dispute. 
[8] Accord and Satisfaction <®s* 10(1) 
8 — 
8k6 Part Payment 
8kl0 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims 
8kl0(l) In General. 
To satisfy the requirement that there be a good-faith 
disagreement over the amount due under the contract, 
as required to establish an accord and satisfaction, the 
disagreement need not be well-founded, so long as it is 
in good faith. 
[9] Contracts <®^ > 15 
95 — 
951 Requisites and Validity 
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance 
95kl5 Necessity of Assent. 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the 
parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or 
implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced. 
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[10] Trial <@ >^358 
388 — 
388IX Verdict 
388IX(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings 
388k358 Inconsistent Findings. 
Where a jury's special verdict findings support 
inconsistent legal claims, a court is not precluded from 
applying the law to those findings and entering 
judgment for a party on one theory, as a matter of law, 
which precludes judgment on another inconsistent legal 
theory. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 49(a). 
[11] Accord and Satisfaction <S=» 10(1) 
8 — 
8k6 Part Payment 
8kl0 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims 
8kl0(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[11] Accord and Satisfaction <®^=> 11 (2) 
8 — 
8k6 Part Payment 
8kl 1 Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment in 
Full 
8k 11(2) Remittances on Condition. 
Waiver provision in commercial lease providing 
that acceptance of rent did not constitute waiver did not 
preclude finding of accord and satisfaction based on 
tenants' tender of check for disputed rent amount, as 
lease provision did not provide that acceptance of 
partial rent did not constitute accord and satisfaction, 
and landlord could not claim that check tendered by 
tenants was partial rent, as there was no agreement as 
to amount of rent upon expiration of lease. 
[12] Landlord and Tenant <®=^238 
233 — 
233 VIII Rent and Advances 
23 3 VIII(B) Actions 
233k238 Costs. 
Landlord was entitled to administrative fees 
*726259 in dispute with commercial tenant, despite 
jury's finding of accord and satisfaction with respect to 
rent due, where lease unambiguously provided that 
tenants would pay for all costs and fees association with 
supervising and administering common areas. 
[13] Landlord and Tenant <@ >^216 
233 — 
233 VIII Rent and Advances 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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233 VHI(A) Rights and Liabilities 
233k216 Penalties or Double Rent 
Landlord was not entitled to late fees under lease 
provision based on tenant's alleged failure to pay rent, 
as there was accord and satisfaction as to rent due, and 
thus tenants were current on rent payments 
[14] Appeal and Error <§=* 1177(5) 
30 — 
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause 
30XVII(P) Reversal 
30k 1177 Necessity of New Trial 
30kl 177(5) Errors in Rulings and 
Instructions at Trial 
Remand was necessary in dispute between landlord 
and commercial tenants to determine which party was 
entitled to attorney fees as prevailing party, where trial 
court's finding of unlawful detamer was reversed on 
appeal 
Third District, Coalville Department 
The Honorable Robert K Hilder 
The Honorable Pat B Brian 
Dwayne A Vance and David B Thompson, Park 
City, for Appellants 
Robert M Felton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge 
** 1 f 1 Plaintiffs James and Nancy Dishinger dba 
TCBY Yogurt (the Dishingers) appeal the trial court's 
judgment finding them m unlawful detamer Defendant 
Jana Potter dba Silver Queen Hotel (Potter) cross-
appeals the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on 
the meaning of "prevailing rate" and its failure to award 
her administrative, late, and attorney fees We reverse 
and remand 
BACKGROUND 
1 2 In May of 1990, Erik Ziskend entered into a 
commercial lease with Potter for premises located on 
Mam Street m Park City, Utah On May 31, 1994, 
Ziskend assigned the lease to the Dishingers Potter 
consented to the assignment The Dishingers operated 
a frozen yogurt shop on the premises 
1 3 The lease provided for continuous three year 
options after expiration of the initial three year lease 
term Under the terms of the lease, the Dishingers, as 
tenants, were required to notify Potter m writing of 
then" desire to exercise the option 120 days prior to the 
expiration of the current lease term The lease 
specified that the rental rate for an option period would 
be "adjusted upward, but not less than the current 
Minimum Monthly Rent bemg paid, to the then 
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings m the Mam 
Street area of Park City, Utah" (FN1) 
1[4 On February 1, 1996, the Dishingers notified 
Potter in writing of their desire to exercise the lease 
renewal option Thereafter, the following 
correspondence took place On April 4, 1996, Potter 
advised the Dishingers that the prevailing rental rate of 
similar buildings on Mam Street m Park City was $30 
per square foot and thus, pursuant to the lease, $30 per 
square foot ($2,425 00/month) would constitute the 
new base monthly rent The Dishingers responded that, 
based on the appraisal they had performed, the 
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings was $19 per 
square foot ($1,535 83/month) 
f 5 At the commencement of the July 1, 1996 
renewal period, without an agreement as to what would 
constitute the base monthly rent, the Dishingers began 
paying rent m an amount reflecting their appraisal of 
$19 per square foot They sent Potter a check for 
$1,976 92, clearly notmg it was for "New Base Rent" 
On July 8, 1996, Potter sent the Dishingers a notice of 
default on the grounds that the Dishingers were 
$889 17 delinquent m their July rental payment On 
July 13, 1996, Potter served the Dishingers with a 
notice to pay the remaining rent or quit On July 15, 
1996, Potter negotiated the Dishinger's July 1 rent 
check On the first of eveiy month, from July 1996 
through June 1997, the Dishingers sent Potter a check 
for $2,137 11 (FN2) reflecting $19 per square foot in 
base monthly rent Potter negotiated each of those 
checks 
16 On August 8, 1996, the Dishmgers filed a 
declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to 
interpret the lease provision regarding the monthly 
rental rate Potter counter-claimed for breach of lease 
and unlawful detamer 
**2 f 7 After a jury trial, the jury returned a 
special verdict answering a number of factual 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U S Govt works 
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questions. In the special verdict the jury found there 
was a legitimate dispute as to the "then prevailing 
rental rate," that the Dishingers tendered payment to 
Potter in full satisfaction of the disputed amount based 
on their appraisal of $19, and that Potter accepted the 
rent payments after the July 13 notice to quit. The jury 
also found the "then prevailing rental rate" to be $25 
per square foot, and as such, Potter was entitled to 
recover the balance of base rent, totaling $8,730. 
1J8 The Dishingers filed a motion for entry of 
judgment based on the special verdict, arguing that the 
jury's special verdict established an accord and 
satisfaction, which fixed the base rental rate at $19 per 
square foot, and thus, they were current in monthly 
payments and Potter's unlawful detainer claim should 
be dismissed. The Dishingers also argued that a 
determination that they were in unlawful detainer of the 
premises was precluded because Potter accepted rental 
payments after serving the notice to quit, thus waiving 
forfeiture of the lease. 
<| 9 The trial court, first Judge Brian, then Judge 
Hilder in an amended judgment, entered judgment for 
Potter. The trial court concluded that, based on the 
findings of the jury in its special verdict, it was "clear" 
that while Potter accepted payments after the notice to 
quit, the amount received "did not represent a full 
payment of base rent," and thus did not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction. Thus, the trial court concluded 
the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer and entered 
judgment in favor of Potter for $8,730, which was 
trebled to $26,190 pursuant to Utah Code §vnn. 
78-36-10 (1996). This appeal followed. 
^ 10 On appeal, the Dishingers argue the trial court 
was precluded from determining they were in unlawful 
detainer because the jury's special verdict established 
an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, the Dishingers argue that Potter affirmed 
the lease by accepting rent payments, thereby waiving 
forfeiture of the lease, and thus precluding a finding of 
unlawful detainer. 
^ 11 Potter cross-appeals, arguing the trial court 
should have instructed the jury that the "then prevailing 
rental rate" meant market rate. Potter also argues the 
trial court erred by failing to award her administrative 
fees, late fees, and attorney fees as required by the 
lease. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Preliminary Issues 
^ 12 In addition to the claims raised in her cross-
appeal, Potter asserts that the Dishingers failed to 
preserve their claims below, failed to provide a 
transcript of the proceedings and marshal the evidence, 
and cannot rely on the jury's special verdict because it 
was merely advisory. Before addressing the main 
substantive issues on appeal, we first address these 
threshold arguments. 
A. Preservation of Claims 
[1][2] 113 Potter first argues the Dishingers failed 
to preserve their claim of accord and satisfaction in 
accordance with Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a)(5)(A) provides that 
"[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain ... citation to 
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court." Utah RApp. P. 24(a)(5)(A). The 
Dishingers reference several places in the record to 
show that the issue of accord and satisfaction was 
preserved in the trial court. (FN3) Thus, Potter's 
argument that the Dishingers did not preserve the issue 
of accord and satisfaction is without merit. (FN4) 
B. Marshaling the Evidence 
**3 [3^ [ 14 Potter next argues the Dishingers 
needed to provide a transcript of the proceedings to 
allow meaningful review of the evidence, and have also 
failed to marshal the evidence. A transcript of the 
proceedings is not required because the Dishingers are 
relying on the jury's special verdict on appeal, not the 
evidence presented at tria See, e.g Pugh v. North 
Am. Warranty Servs., Inc. 2000 UT App 121^ 11, 1 
P.3d 570. Moreover, the marshaling requirement 
applies only when challenging findings of f See 
Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12f 24, 973 P.2d 431. 
Clearly, the Dishingers are not challenging findings of 
fact. Rather, they are challenging the trial court's 
application of the law to the jury's special verdict 
findings and thus the Dishingers do not have the burden 
of marshaling the evidence. 
C. Advisory Juiy Verdict 
[4] H 15 Relying oi Peirce v. Peirce 2000 UT 7, 
994 P.2d 193, Potter next argues that the jury's special 
verdict was merely advisory, and therefore the trial 
court was not bound by the jury's findings in the special 
verdict. Potter's reliance c Peirce is misplaced. In 
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Peirce, the issue before the court was "whether the jury 
served in an advisory capacity or whether [the] case 
was tried by a jury as a matter of rig! Id alf 12. 
However, the plaintiff Peirc was seeking an 
equitable remedy. See id. "When a jury is used in an 
equity case, it acts in an advisory a /d.ity," 
(quoting Romrell v. lions First Nat'l Ban 611 P.2d 
392, 394 (Utah 1980) (quotation and citation 
omitted)), " 'unless both parties have clearly consented 
to accept a jury verdict.' " Id. at % 13 (quoting Romrell, 
611 P.2d at 394 see als Utah R. Civ. P. 39(c). 
Because the parties did not clearly consent to accept a 
jury verdict, and the record indicated that the trial court 
treated the jury as advisory, the court held that the jury 
served only in an advisory capacity and thus afforded 
no deference to its findings. See id. at Tf 15. 
If 16 In the instant case, we are not dealing with an 
action in equity. Both the Dishingers and Potter 
pursued legal claims, the Dishingers specifically 
demanded a jury trial on those claims, and at no time 
did the trial court inform the parties or the jury that the 
jury was merely advise (Goldberg v. Jay 
Timmons & Assoc* 896 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995) (stating, "if the trial court had intended ... 
to use an advisory jury, it should have notified the 
parties before the trial began"). Where, as here, the 
case is tried to a juiy as a matter of right, Rule 49(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial 
court to "require a jury to return only a special verdict 
in the form of a special written finding upon each issue 
of fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a). "The [trial] court then 
applies the law to the facts as found and renders a 
verdict." Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'? 24 Utah 
2d 292, 298, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (1970) (Ellett, 1, 
further opinion) (commenting on Rule 49(a)). 
**4 [^[17 As Justice Ellett explained in 
Brigham: 
The special verdict was devised to relieve the jury 
of attempting to apply the law in a complicated case 
to the facts in arriving at a verdict. Instructions to 
the jury are thus simplified, and the jurors may, 
therefore, concentrate upon the functions which 
belong to them, viz., to find the facts in the case. 
Id. Thus, "[i]n [the] case of a special verdict, the 
jury only finds the facts, and the court applies the law 
thereto and renders the verdi< L This is what 
occurred in the instant case. The trial court instructed 
the jury. "[I]t is yoi exclusive duty to determine the 
facts in this case, and to consider and weigh the 
evidence for that purpose"; "You are exclusive 
judges of the facts and the evide" (Emphasis 
added.) The trial court then entered judgment,ifase<f 
upon the evidence and the special verdict" (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, the jury was not merely advisory. 
Rather, the jury found the facts as set forth in its special 
verdict and the trial court entered judgment applying 
the law to those facts. 
II. Accord and Satisfaction 
[6] Tf 18 The Dishingers argue that an accord and 
satisfaction occurred prior to trial which set the rental 
rate at $19 per square foot thus precluding a finding of 
unlawful detainer. They claim the jury's special verdict 
answers require a legal determination of accord and 
satisfaction. Whether the special verdict established an 
accord and satisfaction is a question of law which we 
review for correctness without any deference to the trial 
court. SeeProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile 2000 UT 41f 
17,998P.2d254. 
A. Elements of Accord and Satisfaction 
[7] Tf 19 To establish an accord and satisfaction, 
three elements must be present: "(1) an unliquidated 
claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a 
payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute; 
and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement 
of the dispute." Id. at % 20 (citing Marton Remodeling 
v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607,609-10 (Utah 1985)). 
1. Bona Fide Dispute Over Amount Due 
[8] [9] If 20 To satisfy the first element, "There must 
be a good-faith disagreement over the amount due 
under the contract. The disagreement need not be well-
founded, so long as it is in good Estate 
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Cc 844 P.2d 322, 326 
(Utah 1992) (citing Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 
699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985 Ashton v. Skeen 85 
Utah 489, 496, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935)). The jury 
clearly found that there was a good faith disagreement 
over the amount due under the lease. (FN5) The jury 
was asked: 
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
legitimate dispute existed as to the "then prevailing 
rental rate of similar buildings in the Main Street 
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area of Park City" at the time the [Dishingers] made 
monthly rental payments based on $19 per square 
foot as satisfaction in full? 
**5 To this question the jury answered, "Yes." 
Thus, the first element of accord and satisfaction was 
established by the jury's special verdict. 
2. Payment Tendered in Full Satisfaction of Dispute 
f 21 The jury found that the payments tendered by 
the Dishingers were made in Ml satisfaction of the 
disputed rent. The jury was asked: "Considering all the 
evidence in this case, do you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the [Dishingers] notified [Potter] 
that these payments were made in full satisfaction of the 
disputed rent amount?" The jury answered, "Yes." 
Thus, the second element of accord and satisfaction 
was established by the jury's special verdict. 
3. Acceptance of Payment as Full Settlement of 
Dispute 
If 22 In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court 
reasoned that the third element of accord and 
satisfaction may be satisfied by the creditor's subjective 
intent to discharge an obligation by assenting to the 
accord, oi conduct which gives rise to a reasonable 
inference that acceptance of payment discharged the 
obligation. See Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330. 
f 23 In the instant case, the jury found that Potter 
accepted the monthly payments made by the 
Dishingers. The jury was asked: "Considering all of 
the evidence in this case, do you find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that [Potter] accepted 
the monthly rent payments made by the [Dishingers] 
which are calculated at a rate of $19 per square foot?" 
The jury answered, "Yes." However, the jury did not 
make a finding that Potter subjectively intended to 
assent to the accord. The fact that Potter counter-
claimed for breach of the lease and unlawful detainer 
shows she did not subjectively intend to assent to the 
accord. Thus, to find an accord and satisfaction, we 
must determine whether Potter's conduct established 
the accord and satisfaction as a matter of law. 
Tl 24 IT Estate Landscape the defendant sent the 
plaintiff a check for $8,613, and followed it with a 
letter stating that the check was "payment in full for 
satisfaction of contracted services. If you are not 
willing to accept that sum, .. in full satisfaction of the 
sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your 
negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as 
fully paid.' Io at 324-25 (emphasis omitted). The 
plaintiff filed suit to recover the $30,162.50 it thought 
it was owed by the defendant, then negotiated the 
$8,613 check, and amended its complaint to recover 
the difference. See id. at 325. 
K 25 The trial court ruled that negotiation of the 
check did not constitute an accord and satisfaction. See 
id. This court affirmed, over Judge Jackson's dissent, 
reasoning that the defendant's letter was "entirely 
unilateral," and that the plaintiffs 
signature on the check is not an assent to an accord 
not found on the face of the check as a restrictive 
endorsement, where the party to whom the accord is 
offered has expressly rejected the proposed accord, 
continued the dispute, and filed litigation to resolve 
it adversarially in court. 
* * < ! > Estate Landscape & Snow Removal 
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. <£ Tel. Co., 
793 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (footnote 
omitted),revW, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992). 
f 26 The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and 
reversed, holding, "Where, as here, the check is 
tendered under the condition that negotiation will 
constitute Ml settlement, mere negotiation of the check 
constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts 
or intent to negate the condition Estate Landscape, 
844 P.2d at 330. Thus, " '[w]hat is said is overridden 
by what is done, and assent is imputed as an inference 
of law.' Id. (quoting Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 
258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373, 374 (1931 see also 
Morton Remodeling v. Jense 706 P.2d 607, 609 
(Utah 1985) (holding negotiation of check with 
restrictive condition is an accord and satisfaction even 
though creditor wrote "not full payment" beneath 
condition prior to negotiation) Cove View Excavating 
& Constr. Co. v. Fly) 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) (finding an accord and satisfaction even 
though creditor crossed out restrictive condition on 
check before negotiation). 
i^ 27 In the instant case, the Dishinger's first check 
noted the amount thereof was for "New Base Rent." 
Therefore, because Potter negotiated the check, which 
was tendered by the Dishingers in full satisfaction of 
the disputed amount of the base monthly rent, the fact 
that Potter at the same time brought an action for 
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breach of lease and unlawful detainer is of no legal 
consequence. (FN6) The third and final element of 
accord and satisfaction was established by Potter's 
conduct. 
B. Special Verdict 
K 28 In its special verdict, the jury found: (1) "that a 
legitimate dispute existed as to the 'then prevailing 
rental rate of similar buildings in the Main Street area 
of Park City' at the time the [Dishingers] made monthly 
rental payments based on $19 per square foot as 
satisfaction in full;" (2) the Dishingers "notified [Potter] 
that [the] payments were made in foil satisfaction of the 
disputed amount;" and (3) Potter "accepted the monthly 
rent payments made by the [Dishingers] ... at a rate of 
$19 per square foot." 
Tl 29 However, the jury also found that the 
prevailing rental rate was $25 per square foot, and that 
Potter was entitled to recover the "balance of base rent" 
from the Dishingers, totaling $8,730. Based on these 
findings, the trial court entered judgment for Potter, 
concluding that no accord and satisfaction existed and 
that the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer because 
the amount Potter received and accepted each month 
was less than what the jury subsequently determined to 
be the rental rate. 
[10] 1f30 Although it could be argued that the 
special verdict supports inconsistent legal theories 
(accord and satisfaction and unlawful detainer), the 
inconsistency is not fatal. The juiy was instructed to 
answer all factual questions on all legal theories 
presented in the special verdict. While the jury's 
findings support inconsistent legal claims, a court is not 
precluded, under Rule 49(a), from applying the law to 
those findings and entering judgment for a party on one 
theory, as a matter of law, which precludes judgment 
on another inconsistent legal theor SeiMilligan v. 
Capitol Furniture Co. 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335 P.2d 
619, 622 (1959) (holding inconsistent special verdict 
answers immaterial under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a see 
also Tsudek v. Target Stores, Inc 414 N.W.2d 466, 
469-70 (Minn.Ct.App,1987) (finding inconsistent 
special verdict answers reconcilable where jury was 
simply answering all questions submitted based on the 
evidence) Thus, as was the case here, if the special 
verdict findings support, as a matter of law, an accord 
and satisfaction then there cannot be an unlawful 
detainer. 
C. Effect of Lease Provision 
**7 [111(31 Potter responds that even if the 
jury's special verdict findings support an accord and 
satisfaction, the lease itself precludes an accord and 
satisfaction. Potter relies on the "Waiver" provision of 
the lease which states: 
The waiver by Landlord of any term, covenant or 
condition herein contained shall not be deemed to 
be a waiver of such terms, covenant or condition or 
any subsequent breach of the same or any other 
term, covenant or condition herein containec The 
subsequent acceptance of rent hereunder by 
Landlord shall not be deemed to be a waiver of 
any preceding default by Tenant of any term, 
covenant or condition of this Lease, other than the 
failure of Tenant to pay particular rent also 
accepted, regardless of Landlord's knowledge of 
such preceding default at the time of the acceptance 
of such rent 
(Emphasis added.) Potter asserts that under this 
lease provision, "acceptance of partial rent could not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction." 
If 32 Though not perfectly drafted, the boilerplate 
language of this "Waiver" provision is not ambiguous. 
The relevant portion, emphasized above, provides that 
if the Dishingers default on any term, covenant, or 
condition of the lease, and thereafter tender a rental 
payment to Potter, and Potter accepts, by accepting, 
Potter has not waived the prior defaults. For example, 
if the Dishingers install exterior lighting as prohibited 
by the lease, the installation, if not cured within thirty 
days of notice, is a default. If, thereafter, the 
Dishingers send Potter a rent check which Potter 
accepts, Potter has not waived the Dishinger's default 
for the installation. However, if the Dishinger's default 
for failure to pay rent, and thereafter tender a rental 
payment to Potter, which Potter accepts, Potter thereby 
waives the Dishinger's default for failure to pay rent. 
U 33 What the lease provision does not provide, is 
that acceptance of partial rent does not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction. In fact, the term "accord and 
satisfaction" is conspicuously absent from the face of 
the lease, and beyond the "Waiver" provision, Potter 
fails to point to any language in the lease that would 
support her strained construction. Additionally, and 
perhaps more importantly, Potter cannot claim that the 
initial check tendered by the Dishingers was "partial 
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rent," when there was never an agreement as to what 
would actually be the rental rate. While hindsight 
suggests that Potter should have provided for such a 
situation in the lease, we cannot write such a provision 
into the lease for h Se Jones v. ERA Brokers 
Console 2000 UT 6\\ 18, 6 P.3d 1129 see alscRio 
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 
1980); Provo City Corp. v. Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 
803,806 (Utah 1979). Thus, Potter's argument that the 
lease prohibits an accord and satisfaction is not 
supported by the lease itself. 
Tl 34 In sum, the jury's special verdict established as 
a matter of law an accord and satisfaction. The trial 
court erred in not entering a judgment on the rental rate 
for the option period in favor of the Dishingers. We 
therefore reverse the trial court's judgment of unlawful 
detainer and remand for the entry of a judgment for the 
Dishingers based on the legal theory of accord and 
satisfaction setting the rental rate at $19 per square 
foot. (FN7) 
III. Administrative, Late, and Attorney Fees 
**8 [12] ^ f 35 Potter argues that the lease provides 
that the Dishingers shall pay administrative, late, and 
attorney fees. Potter submitted her claims for 
administrative and late fees to the jury. In its special 
verdict, the juiy found that, in addition to what the 
Dishingers had already paid to Potter, Potter was only 
entitled to the "Balance of base rent." Based on this 
finding, the trial court determined that Potter was not 
entitled to administrative and late fees. However, this 
was properly a legal not a factual determination. The 
lease is clear and unambiguous that Potter was entitled 
to administrative fees. The lease states in no uncertain 
terms that the tenant shall pay for all costs and fees 
associated with supervising and administering to the 
common areas. (FN8) 
U 36 The Dishingers respond that Potter's argument 
for administrative fees was not presented below. 
However, the trial court clearly ruled on the issue based 
on the jury's special verdict findings. Thus, Potter's 
claim for administrative fees was presented below. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court for 
an award of Potter's administrative fees. 
[13] f^ 37 The lease further provides 
Tenant shall pay to Landlord late charg< of ten 
($10.00) dollars per day until the amount due is 
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paid in full. Tenant further agrees to pay any 
attorney's fees [sic] incurred by Landlord by reason 
of Tenant's failure to pay rent and/or other charges 
when due hereunder. 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, Potter was only entitled 
to late fees and attorney fees under this provision if the 
Dishingers failed to pay rent. Because we conclude 
there was an accord and satisfaction, the Dishingers 
were current on their rent payments and therefore 
Potter was not entitled to late fees. (FN9) 
[14] Tf 38 The trial court determined that Potter was 
not entitled to attorney fees because the lease provided 
that the "prevailing party shall be entitled to recover" 
its attorney fees, and while Potter prevailed on her 
counter-claim, the Dishingers prevailed on their claims 
for an accounting and credit for overcharges of 
common area expenses. Thus, the trial court 
determined neither party should be awarded attorney 
fees because both prevailed. 
f^ 39 Because we conclude that there was an accord 
and satisfaction and thus no unlawful detainer, the 
"prevailing party" issue as to attorney fees should be 
reconsidered by the trial court on remand. Therefore, 
pursuant to the terms of the lease, Potter is entitled to 
her administrative fees, and we remand to have the trial 
court determine if either party should be awarded 
attorney fees as the "prevailing party" under the lease. 
CONCLUSION 
Tj 40 We conclude, based on the jury's special 
verdict, an accord and satisfaction occurred as a matter 
of law fixing the "then prevailing rental rate" for the 
option period of the lease at $19 per square foot in base 
monthly rent. Therefore, because the Dishingers were 
in lawful possession of the premises, we reverse the 
trial court's legal determination of unlawful detainer 
and its award of treble damages. We further conclude 
that under the terms of the lease, Potter was entitled to 
her administrative fees and remand for the trial court to 
determine if either party is entitled to attorney fees as 
the "prevailing party" under the lease. 
141 I CONCUR: WILLIAM A. THORNE, Jr., 
Judge. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
**9 142 I cannot agree there was an accord and 
satisfaction in this case. While there was a bona fide 
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dispute over the new rental rate and the Dishingers may 
well have tendered their payments with the thought it 
was in Ml satisfaction of what was due, there is no 
finding that Pott acceptex the payments in full 
satisfaction nor any basis in the evidence to conclude 
that she did so. On the contrary, the Dishingers and 
Potter had exchanged letters indicating very different 
views of what constituted the "then prevailing rental 
rate." Nothing suggests either side thereafter acceded 
to the view of the other or that they reached a 
compromise. On the contrary, within days of accepting 
the Dishingers' check, Potter sent the Dishingers a 
default notice stating what she believed the shortfall to 
be. A couple of weeks later, the Dishingers filed their 
declaratory judgment action acknowledging there was a 
dispute between the parties and asking the court to 
resolve it-not claiming there had been a dispute 
between the parties that had been resolved by accord 
and satisfaction and asking the court to enforce the 
accord. 
Tl 43 Applicable law does not require anything 
inconsistent with the expectations of the parties, as 
shown by their conduct. The "New Base Rent" 
notation, apparently made in the "For " space 
on the front of the check, clearly does not satisfy the 
UCC's requirement that "the instrument or an 
accompanying written communication containf ] a 
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument 
was tendered &full satisfactiof of the claim." Utah 
Code Ann § 70A-3-311(2) (1997) (emphasis added). 
In addition, cases relied on by the majority are 
inapposite. In both Marfan Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 
P.2d 607 (Utah 1985), an Cove View Excavating & 
Construction Co. v. Fly 758 P.2d 474 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988), unlike in this case, the checks 
evidencing the accord and satisfaction contained actual 
restrictive endorsement provisio IMarton 
Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 608 ("Endorsement hereof 
constitutes full and final satisfaction of any and all 
claims...."); Cove Vie 758 P.2d at 476 (check 
contained "pmt. in full" language on front of check and 
this restrictive endorsement language on back of check: 
"payment in full for all labor and materials to 6/26/84"). 
In Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. 
v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Ct 844 
P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), a detailed letter made it clear 
that the check could be accepted only as full payment. 
See id. at 324-25. 
f^ 44 As a matter of law, the facts in this case do not 
establish an accord and satisfaction. The jury 
recognized this and went on to find that the prevailing 
rental rate was $25 per square foot and that the 
Dishingers owed this to Potter under their contract. 
Does this mean the Dishingers unlawfully detained the 
premises, subjecting them to treble damages? It does 
not. Potter, in her "notice to pay rent or quit," 
demanded payment of a sum well in excess of what she 
was entitled to contractually. The jury found the 
prevailing rate was $25, but she had demanded 
payment of $30. The invalid demand renders the notice 
completely ineffective to place the Dishingers in a state 
of unlawful detainer. 
**10. *| 45 When the dust settles in this case, the 
proper result emerges with reasonable clarity. The 
Dishingers did not owe as much as Potter thought they 
did, but they owed more than they thought they did. 
There was no accord and satisfaction, so they are liable 
for the shortage. On the other hand, Potter had no right 
to demand payment of an amount to which she was not 
entitled, so she may not have the lesser amount to 
which she was actually entitled trebled, nor is she 
entitled to any other relief specially available under the 
unlawful detainer statute. Clearly, then, there is no 
prevailing party here-each side won a little and lost a 
little-so neither side is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees. 
\ 46 On remand, I would simply have the trial court 
amend its judgment to reflect the foregoing. 
(FN1.) From a review of the record it appears that the 
Dishingers were paying $18.48 per square foot in 
minimum monthly rent at the time they notified 
Potter of their desire to exercise the option. 
(FN2.) The Dishingers subtracted $160.19 from the 
July 1, 1996 rental payment for remaining credits 
and premature Consumer Price Index increases 
occurring in 1994 and 1995. 
(FN3.) The Dishinger's citations to the record 
reference the jury's special verdict; the Dishinger's 
motion for entry of judgment based on special 
verdict; the Dishinger's memorandum in support of 
motion for relief from judgment; and the 
Dishinger's supplemental memorandum in support 
of motion for relief from judgment. In all these 
instances the issue of accord and satisfaction was 
raised in the trial court 
(FN4.) We note the issue of accord and satisfaction 
was not raised in the pleadings. However, Rule 
15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
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that issues not raised in the pleadings may be tried 
by express or implied consent. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
15(b). "If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide 
the issue and deem the pleadings amended even if 
the issue was not originally pleaded." Shinkoskey v. 
Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 4J6 n. 2, 19 P.3d 
1005 (citing Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 
(Utah Ct.App.1995) (citation omitted)). "Whether 
the pleadings may be deemed amended depends on 
whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to 
[prepare and meet the issue]. Id (citing Colman 
v. Colman, 743 P.2d782, 785 (Utah Ct.App.1987) 
). It must be evident from the record that the issue 
has been tried. See id. (citing Fisher, 907 P.2d at 
1176). 
A review of the record reveals that evidence 
regarding the existence of an accord and 
satisfaction was presented at trial, and the jury was 
instructed on and made findings of fact that would 
support an accord and satisfaction. Additionally, 
the Dishingers argued accord and satisfaction in 
their motion for entry of judgment based on special 
verdict, which Potter had the opportunity to rebut 
and the trial court entered judgment finding there 
was no accord and satisfaction. Thus, because 
Potter had the opportunity to prepare and meet the 
issue, we conclude that the issue of an accord and 
satisfaction was tried by implication. 
(FN5.) Although neither party has addressed this issue 
in their briefs, we note at the outset that the option 
provision in the lease is most likely unenforceable 
in Utah. It is a well-recognized principle that, "A 
condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be meeting of the mind of 
the parties, which must be spelled out, either 
expressly or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness 
to be enforced.' Pingree v. Continental Group of 
Utah, Inc. 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). Pingree, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
"a provision for the extension or renewal of a lease 
must specify the time the lease is to extend and the 
rate to be paid with such a degree of certainty and 
definiteness that nothing is left to future 
determination. If it falls short of this requirement, it 
is not enforceable." 
Id. at 1321 (quoting Slayterv. Pasley, 199 Or. 616, 
264 P.2d 444,446 (Or. 1953)). 
In the instant case, the lease provided that the rental 
rate for the renewal period would be "the then 
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the 
Main Street area of Park City." On July 1, 1996, 
the commencement of the renewal period, the 
parties had yet to agree on what constituted "the 
then prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the 
Main Street area of Park City." Both parties had 
communicated to the other a vastly different rate 
and interpretation, and the Dishingers filed a 
declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to 
interpret the provision. Thus, it cannot be said that 
the rate provided for in the option provision of the 
lease possesses the certainty and definiteness 
required to be enforced. In sum, there was no 
meeting of the minds, and as a result, no agreement. 
Therefore, the lease terminated by its own terms as 
of July 1, 1996. However, because we conclude 
that an accord and satisfaction occurred, the 
unenforceability of the option provision does not 
affect our analysis. 
**10_ (FN6.) In response, Potter attempts to rely on 
language froi Tates, Inc. v. Little America 
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975), wherein 
our supreme court stated, "Ordinarily, the payment 
of part of a debt does not discharge it.... The reason 
for this is that in making the part payment, the 
debtor is doing nothing more than he is legally 
obligated to dc 1 at 1229. This general 
statement is true, to the extent that there is no 
"dispute or uncertainty as to the amount due." Id. at 
1229-30. In the instant case it is well established 
that there is a dispute as to the amount due. 
(FN7.) Because we conclude there was an accord and 
satisfaction and thereby reverse the trial court's 
legal conclusion that the Dishingers were in 
unlawful detainer, we do not address the 
Dishinger's alternative argument of waiver and 
Potter's cross-appeal regarding the definition of the 
term "prevailing rate." 
(FN8.) Specifically, the lease states that the tenant 
shall pay 
All costs to supervise and administer said common 
areas, used in common by the tenants or occupants 
of the building. [S]aid costs shall include such fees 
as may be paid to a third party in connection with 
same and shall in any event include a fee to 
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Landlord to supervise and administer same in an 
amount equal to ten (10%) of the total costs of (i) 
above. 
(FN9.) Potter does not argue she was entitled to 
attorney fees under this provision. 
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